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THE DEPRAVED SEXUAL INSTINCT THEORY:
AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROPENSITY FOR
ABERRANT APPLICATION OF
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
404(b)
I. INTRODUCTION
Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b) is one of the most frequently litigated evi-
dentiary issues.1 More published opinions have arisen regarding this rule
than any other subsection of the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 Allegations
of errors in admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) comprise the most
common ground for appeal in criminal cases in many jurisdictions. 3 The
Federal Rules' prohibition against introducing character evidence to
prove conduct on a specific occasion4 is at issue particularly in criminal
cases.5 The admissibility of such evidence is arguably the single most
important issue in contemporary criminal evidence law.' However, it ap-
1. 2 JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404(08)
(1982) (stating that Rule 404(b) has generated more reported decisions than any other subsec-
tion of Federal Rules of Evidence).
2. Id.
3. 22 CHARLES WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: EVIDENCE § 5239 (1978).
4. FED. R. EID. 404(a) provides:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of the accused.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-
dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.-Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609.
5. Several cases have implied that the prohibition of Rule 404(b) has constitutional over-
tones when applied to the criminal defendant. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (reaffirming that part of presumption of innocence in American jurisprudence
is fundamental axiom that "a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is"
(quoting United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 U.S.
847 (1978))); Government of Virgin Is. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1976) (suggesting
government's evidence of other crimes undermines presumption of innocence); State v.
Manrique, 531 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. 1975) (holding accused has constitutional right to be held to
answer only to crime charged).
6. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct One of the Most Misunderstood Is-
sues in Criminal Evidence, 1 CRIM. JusT. 6, 7 (1986).
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pears that courts often fail to apply the prohibition on character evidence
properly--especially the prohibition expressed in Rule 404(b).7 As a re-
sult, courts have carved an absolute exception to Rule 404(b)'s proscrip-
tion-an exception which permits the use of specific acts evidence to
show a propensity for aberrant sexual conduct and conformity therewith
on a particular occasion.' This misapplication appears to have arisen
from a general misunderstanding of the prohibition itself, a misunder-
standing that has led to the creation of the Depraved Sexual Instinct
Theory. The theory reveals the problems with the current admissibility
analysis under Rule 404(b).9
Application of Rule 404(b) in the area of sex crimes demonstrates
the dangers inherent in the rule.10 This Comment discusses the narrow
application of Rule 404(b) in the area of sex crimes to demonstrate that
the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory is actually nothing more than char-
acter propensity evidence."1 While Rule 404(b) is important in the civil
context, this Comment focuses on criminal cases involving sexual of-
fenses. The analysis consists of two parts. First, this Comment briefly
examines the theory behind Rule 404(b) and the character propensity
analysis. 2 This Comment then analyzes the application of 404(b) in the
specific area of sex crimes at both the federal and state levels with partic-
ular regards to the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory."
This Comment concludes that courts should return to a strict adher-
ence to the fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that a person be
tried only for what he has done and not for who he may be.14 The Au-
thor recommends that Rule 404(b) should no longer be regarded as a rule
7. See infra notes 130-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 152-70 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 144-54 and accompanying text. Throughout this Comment the phrase
"character propensity inference" is used. This term of art refers to the inference that a jury
makes based on specific acts evidence admitted at trial. The inference drawn is that the ac-
cused has acted or will act in conformity with a character trait.
13. See infra notes 171-272 and accompanying text.
14. Throughout this Comment, the accused is referred to by the masculine pronoun. This
is only for the author's convenience and to prevent awkward sentence structure. The mascu-
line pronoun was chosen over the feminine because in the vast majority of cases involving sex
crimes, men are the perpetrators and women and children their victims. Although there are
cases of women committing sex crimes, their victims tend to be children only. As men consti-
tute the primary perpetrators of sex crimes in general, and as this Comment is not limited to
merely crimes against children, it seemed more appropriate and convenient to limit references
to the accused to the masculine gender. The use of the masculine pronoun is not intended in
any manner to imply that only men are defendants in sex crime cases.
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of inclusion"5 and suggests that Rule 404(b) should be considered a rule
of exclusion except where it is used for the very limited purpose of admit-
ting specific acts evidence clearly offered for a non-character propensity
purpose. 6 Finally, this Comment concludes that the current application
of Rule 404(b) in the area of sex crimes is unmanageable and opens the
rules governing character evidence to limitless exceptions. Consistency
demands that, on the one hand, we either strictly enforce the prohibition
against specific acts evidence offered to create a character propensity in-
ference or, on the other hand, eliminate Rule 404(b) in its entirety and
abandon the fundamental principle that protects an accused from being
convicted for who he may be.
II. BACKGROUND
The prohibition against character propensity evidence has a long
history in Anglo-American jurisprudence.17 This prohibition is distinct
15. See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
17. See, eg., State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 275, 276 (1876) (holding in case charging
murder committed during attempted rape, admission of accused's rape of another woman was
improper). The New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1876 recognized the inherent problem
with specific acts evidence and articulated both the difficulty and the state of the law as it then
stood:
If I know a man has broken into my house and stolen my goods, I am for that reason
more ready to believe him guilty of breaking into my neighbor's house and commit-
ting the same crime there. We do not trust our property with a notorious thief. We
cannot help suspecting a man of evil life and infamous character sooner than one
who is known to be free from every taint of dishonesty or crime. We naturally recoil
with fear and loathing from a known murderer, and watch his conduct as we would
the motions of a beast of prey. When the community is startled by the commission of
some great crime, our first search for the perpetrator is naturally directed, not among
those who have hitherto lived blameless lives, but among those whose conduct has
been such as to create the belief that they have the depravity of heart to do the deed.
This is human nature-the teaching of human experience.
If it were the law, that everything which has a natural tendency to lead the mind
towards a conclusion that a person charged with crime is guilty must be admitted in
evidence against him on the trial of that charge, the argument for the State would
doubtless be hard to answer. If I know a man has once been false, I cannot after that
believe in his truth as I did before. If I know he has committed the crime of perjury
once, I more readily believe he will commit the same awful crime again, and I cannot
accord the same trust and confidence to his statements under oath that I otherwise
should....
Suppose the general character of one charged with crime is infamous and de-
graded to the last degree; that his life has been nothing but a succession of crimes of
the most atrocious and revolting sort: does not the knowledge of all this inevitably
carry the mind in the direction of a conclusion that he has added the particular crime
for which he is being tried to the list of those that have gone before? Why, then,
should not the prosecutor be permitted to show facts which tend so naturally to
produce a conviction of his guilt? The answer to all these questions is plain and
decisive: The law is otherwise.
Id. at 299-300 (Ladd, J., concurring).
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from the traditions in Continental criminal trials in which evidence of the
character of the accused, along with evidence of specific acts, was given
considerable weight and was freely used." The inadmissibility of specific
acts evidence in Anglo-American jurisprudence has been explained in
terms of the uncontrovertible relevancy which such evidence bears to the
character of the accused. 19 The purpose of this prohibition is to prevent
the improper conviction of an innocent person on the basis of his
character.2 °
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) essentially has codified this prohi-
bition, yet it is structured in accord with the general tendency of the
Federal Rules to admit all relevant evidence.21 The Federal Rules of
18. RENE DAVID & HENRY P. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 77 (1958) (issues
of reasonable doubt in criminal trials were also resolved by evidence of other acts, prior convic-
tions and general character).
19. JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers
rev. 1983). The objection to specific acts evidence arises from the fact that such evidence has
only marginally probative value. However, in spite of this, the fact finder often attributes
excessive weight to the evidence.
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to
give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow
it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a
condemnation, irrespective of the accused's guilt of the present charge.
Id.
Wigmore suggests that the practical conclusion of the rule is that specific acts evidence
should be excluded from the prosecution's rebuttal of the defense because the use of evidence
of the accused's bad character in any form is already prohibited from being introduced by the
prosecution until the accused has first opened the issue of his character. Id.
20. -Because of the inferential process involved in character reasoning, Professor Im-
winkelried is of the opinion that jurors inevitably judge the accused based on his character, and
herein lies the danger. He writes:
The first inferential step in character reasoning requires the jury to focus on the
accused's disposition or propensity. The jurors must ask themselves: What type of
person is the accused? Is the accused a law-abiding, moral person or a lawbreaking,
immoral individual? At a conscious level, the jurors must dwell on the accused's
personal character.
While consciously deciding whether to infer the accused's subjective bad charac-
ter from the accused's uncharged crimes, at a subconscious level the jurors may be
tempted to punish the accused for the other crimes. The temptation may be espe-
cially acute when the testimony indicates that the accused has not as yet been con-
victed of and punished for the uncharged crime. The uncharged misconduct
evidence may create the impression that to date, the accused has unjustly escaped
punishment for the uncharged misdeeds. The jurors may be tempted to rectify that
injustice by punishing the accused now for the uncharged crimes-even though they
have a reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt of the charged offense.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence on an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove
Mens Rea: The Doctrines That Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130
MIL. L. REv. 41, 47-48 (1990).
21. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777, 797-98 (1981).
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Evidence have provided a model for most state jurisdictions,22 and most
states seem to follow the Federal Rules' prohibition against the use of
character evidence.23 While in general these jurisdictions prohibit spe-
cific acts evidence for the purpose of showing character propensity, these
states employ the inclusionary rule which presumes admissibility unless
the evidence is shown to be otherwise improper.24
However, it appears that the federal courts, while supporting the
inclusionary tendency of 404(b),25 are particularly lax when analyzing
the admissibility of specific acts evidence. The courts articulate a general
purpose for which the evidence is relevant and couch their analysis in the
language of the permissible "other purposes" clause of Rule 404(b).26
These decisions then rely almost entirely on whether the trial court
abused its discretion in determining the admissibility of the evidence.27
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 404: Character Propensity Prohibition
Rule 404 sets forth the restrictions regarding character evidence in
general.28 The rule is one of several which limit the admissibility of spe-
cific types of evidence.29
22. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1218.
23. Id. at 1193.
24. See, e.g., State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1979) (stating evidence of
prior assaults not "so unduly prejudicial that trial court abused its discretion in admitting this
relevant evidence").
25. See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
26. Courts demonstrate this in approving of prosecutors' endeavors to create new theories
under which specific acts evidence should be admitted. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 484
F.2d 127, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974); People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d
1314, 1317-18 (Colo. 1990); State v. Allen, 725 P.2d 331, 333 (Or. 1986). Professor Im-
winkelried discusses one of these theories, the doctrine of objective chances, and seems to
conclude that this theory allows prosecutors to smuggle "inadmissible bad character evidence
into the record under the guise" of a legitimate non-character theory of relevance. Im-
winkelried, supra note 20, at 54.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 151 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th
Cir. 1988). A few cases provide better analyses of the admissibility of specific acts evidence.
See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910-1 1, 913-18 & nn.18-23 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (holding determination of proper purpose required; proper purpose must be other
than to show character), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. O'Connor, 580
F.2d 38, 40-43 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating prosecution must show evidence relevant on issue other
than character); United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1003-09 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding prose-
cution must make affirmative showing of proper purpose; mere recitation that specific acts
evidence falls within recognized exception insufficient). However, these few decisions with
arguably adequate discussions of the question are not representative of the practice among the
federal courts.
28. See notes 4 and 35 for text of the rule.
29. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988); see also FED. R. EViD. 405
(governing methods of proving character); FED. R. EvID. 406 (governing admissibility of evi-
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Generally, under the scheme of the Federal Rules, the prosecution
may not offer any evidence of the accused's bad character" until the
accused offers evidence of his good character.31 This prohibition does
not arise because of irrelevancy 32 but rather from concerns that preju-
dice, confusion or time-consumption will outweigh the probative value of
such evidence. 33 Moreover, this general prohibition against character ev-
idence encompasses the more frequently invoked rule, Rule 404(b),34
which prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence of other acts
of the accused for the purpose of creating a character propensity
inference.35
dence showing habit or routine practice); FED. R. EVID. 407 (governing admissibility of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures); FED. R. EvID. 408 (governing admissibility of
evidence of compromise and offers to compromise); FED. R. EVID. 409 (governing admissibil-
ity of evidence of payment of medical and similar expenses); FED. R. EvID. 410 (governing
admissibility of evidence of pleas, plea discussions and related statements); FED. R. EvID. 411
(governing admissibility of evidence of liability insurance); FED. R. EVID. 412 (governing ad-
missibility in sex offense cases of victim's past behavior).
30. The prosecution may not proffer direct evidence of the accused's bad character nor ask
questions or proffer other types of evidence that insinuate that the accused has committed
other "bad acts" or crimes. See United States v. Shelton, 628 F.2d 54, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(reversing conviction for assault because prosecution's cross-examination of defendant and de-
fense witnesses suggested that all were members of "drug underworld involved in all sorts of
skullduggery"); United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 213 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding mug shots
from police department's "rogues gallery" inadmissible); State v. Kelly, 526 P.2d 720, 729
(Ariz. 1974) (finding mug shot improperly admitted as implying prior criminal record),,cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975). But cf. State v. Hicks, 649 P.2d 267, 273 (Ariz. 1982) (explaining
testimony that defendant's fingerprints were "known prints" was admissible under rule).
31. FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(1).
32. See FED. R. EvID. 402 (stating "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
33. See FED. R. EVID. 403, infra note 99; United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3d
Cir. 1976) (discussing "long standing tradition that protects a criminal defendant from 'guilt
by reputation' and from 'unnecessary prejudice' "); People v. Cardenas, 31 Cal. 3d 897, 905,
647 P.2d 569, 573, 184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 169 (1982) (reversing on grounds of cumulative preju-
dice from evidence of other crimes not related to charge of attempted murder).
34. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
35. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon re-
quest by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The last part of the Rule includes the recent amendment which took
effect on December 1, 1991. While this amendment is primarily procedural, it is likely to have
significant effect on the substantive application of the Rule. As the amendment has only been
operative for a short while, there has been little opportunity for courts to examine its effects.
For a brief examination of the potential effects of the amendment, as they might relate to the
Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory, see infra, note 276.
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1. Character evidence in general-Rule 404(a)
Subsection (a) of Rule 404 addresses the threshold question of the
admissibility of character evidence in general.36 The Rule states that
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissi-
ble for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a partic-
ular occasion."
37
Admissibility of character evidence depends on the purpose for
which it is offered.38 Rule 404(a) provides three instances in which char-
acter evidence is properly admissible.39 The Rule begins by emphasizing
that only evidence of pertinent traits of character are admissible.' If the
evidence demonstrates relevant traits of character, such evidence is ad-
missible when offered by an accused in the defense's case-in-chief or by
the prosecution on cross-examination to rebut the defense's showing of
the accused's character. 1 If this evidence is admissible, the next step in
the analysis is to determine the proper method of proof under Rule 405.42
The second instance where character evidence is admissible involves
two exceptions regarding the character of the victim of a crime.43 First,
a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible when offered by the
accused or by the prosecution in rebuttal once the accused has placed
36. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note.
37. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
38. See id.; David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and
Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 16 (1987) (admitting evidence of
character is limited to three purposes).
39. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
40. Id. The specific analysis behind the admissibility of relevant evidence is governed by
Federal Rules of Evidence 401-403. FED. R. EVID. 401-403. For an overview of the analysis,
see Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-89 (1988).
41. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1). The issue of the prosecution introducing evidence of the
accused's character during cross-examination only arises once the accused has introduced evi-
dence of his own character. The prosecution may not raise the issue of the accused's character
unless the accused has raised it first. Usually this will arise when the accused introduces evi-
dence of his good character. The prosecution, on cross-examination, may then introduce evi-
dence of the accused's bad character, but only to rebut the evidence of the accused's good
character. Id.
42. FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note. Rule 405 states:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputa-
tion or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of char-
acter of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also
be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.
FED. R. EVID. 405. Examination of the analysis behind all character evidence and the meth-
ods of proof is beyond the scope of this Comment.
43. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
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character at issue.' The second exception is a special application of the
first in homicide cases: the prosecution may rebut a defense that the vic-
tim was the first aggressor by introducing evidence that the victim was of
a peaceful character.45
Finally, evidence of the character of a witness is admissible accord-
ing to Rules 607, 608 and 609.4 These rules govern impeachment of
witnesses at trial.4 7
2. Specific acts evidence and the character propensity prohibition-
Rule 404(b)
Rule 404(b) governs the specialized application of the general prohi-
bition against introducing evidence of character to show conduct on a
specific occasion.48 The Rule focuses on evidence that creates a charac-
ter propensity inference, namely evidence of specific acts. 49 This type of
evidence involves the notion that "character" contains qualities of per-
sonality having some moral overtone conveying something good or bad
about a person.50
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or other acts when such evidence is offered for the sole purpose of
creating a character propensity inference. 1 The second sentence of the
Rule asserts that such evidence is properly admissible for certain non-
44. Id.; see also supra note 4.
45. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). However, it is important to note that in all cases, the prose-
cution's introduction of character evidence may only be used to rebut some issue raised by the
accused, and, for the most part, this issue must involve character. See FED. R. EViD.
404(a)(1), (2), 607, 608, 609.
46. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(3) (stating that evidence of witness's character only admissible
as provided in Rules 607, 608 and 609).
47. Federal Rule of Evidence 607 provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling the witness." FED. R. EvID. 607. Rule 608 discusses
the proper methods for attacking the credibility of a witness by using evidence of the witness's
character as shown by opinion and reputation and specific instances of the witness's conduct.
FED. R. EVID. 608. Rule 609 governs impeachment of a witness by introducing evidence of a
conviction of a crime. FED. R. EvID. 609.
48. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
49. Id.
50. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 779. "The notion that character connotes a moral quality is
buttressed by the fact that evidentiary rules traditionally make a distinction between inadmissi-
ble specific acts evidence offered to prove 'character' and potentially admissible specific acts
evidence offered to prove 'habit'." Id. at 779 n.7. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b) with FED.
R. EVID. 406 (recognizing absence of limitations on use of evidence to show habit in proving
action in conformity with such habit).
51. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). This demonstrates a second part of the concept of "character"
which seems to support the notion that "character" affects behavior. Kuhns, supra note 21, at
779. However, the prohibition against specific acts evidence to prove character does not apply
when character is itself an element of a claim or defense. See FED. R. EvID. 405(b).
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character purposes even if the evidence might also be the source of a
character propensity inference. 2 Rule 404(b) lists numerous "other pur-
poses" for which evidence of specific acts is properly admissible,"3 and
the list is neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.5 It is
the "other purposes" clause that courts have used to justify the creation
of absolute exceptions to the general prohibition--exceptions which, in
effect, have swallowed the rule.5
Improper application of Rule 404(b) arises from a misunderstanding
of the Rule's general prohibition against character propensity inferences
and the permissible "other purposes" for which the very same evidence
may be admitted.56 The Rule tries to balance two often conflicting prin-
ciples that form the basis for our system of criminal justice: the general
admissibility of relevant evidence 7 and the policy of judging an accused
solely for the charge before the court.5 8 Specific acts evidence may be
relevant to prove the accused's guilt. 9 As the relevancy standard in the
Federal Rules of Evidence is a relatively low threshold,' evidence of
other acts of the accused that relate in any way to the crime charged
would probably be admitted at trial. However, the danger of prejudice
weighs heavily in favor of excluding such evidence. This evidence might
lead the fact finder to convict the accused improperly: the accused would
be found guilty, not because the prosecution proved guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, but rather because the accused was shown to be a bad
52. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
53. "[Specific acts evidence] may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Id.
54. United States v. Wesevich, 666 F.2d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining evidence of
other offenses admissible for purposes other than those expressly listed in Rule 404(b)); United
States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir.) (stating "[r]ule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule-
i.e., evidence of other crimes is inadmissible under this rule only when it proves nothing but
the defendant's criminal propensities"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981).
55. See discussion of the theory of 404(b) analysis infra notes 103-54 and accompanying
text.
56. See, eg., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911, 913-18 & nn.18-23 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (holding determination required to show relevance of extrinsic evidence to
issue other than character), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. O'Connor, 580
F.2d 38, 40-43 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding prosecution required to show purpose of extrinsic evi-
dence relevant to issue other than character). The "other purposes" clause of Rule 404(b) lists
those commonly applied proper purposes for admitting specific acts evidence. See FED. R.
EVID. 404(b); infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
57. FED. R. EvID. 402.
58. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980); State v. Manrique, 531
P.2d 239, 241 (Or. 1975).
59. Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 48.
60. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
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person. It is precisely this danger of prejudice that forms the basis for
the general prohibition in the Federal Rules against introducing charac-
ter propensity evidence. 2
Despite the general prohibition against character propensity evi-
dence, Rule 404(b) operates, or is applied, as a rule of inclusion.13 As
such, any analysis must start from the premise that if the evidence is
relevant, it is admissible." This places the burden on the party opposing
the introduction of the evidence. Under Rule 404(a) evidence is excluded
to avoid the prejudicial effects of character propensity inferences.6" Rule
404(b) goes one step further by prohibiting evidence of other acts of the
accused offered to show character.6 Such evidence is often referred to as
"specific acts evidence." 67 However, Rule 404(b) then qualifies the pro-
hibition by permitting specific acts evidence of the accused if that evi-
dence is offered for other purposes and not solely to show character.6
A primary example of the problem with such exceptions is especially
manifest in cases involving sex crimes where specific acts evidence is of-
fered to show the accused's prior sexual conduct. 9 The admission of
specific acts evidence in order to show a passion or propensity for unu-
sual, abnormal or depraved sexual relations has been permitted under an
absolute exception carved out of the prohibition against using evidence of
specific conduct to prove character-the Depraved Sexual Instinct
Theory.7 °
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
63. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1988) (holding Rule 404 does
not flatly prohibit introduction of evidence but merely limits purpose for introducing such
evidence); Kuhns, supra note 21, at 781.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
65. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
66. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
67. See Kuhns, supra note 21; Leonard, supra note 38.
68. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
69. The question of the admissibility of alleged sexual misconduct has recently enjoyed
publicity as perhaps never before. This was one of the pivotal issues that arose in the rape trial
of William Kennedy Smith-a media event almost rivaling coverage of the Gulf War. Susan
Estrich, What the Verdict Means-and Doesn't, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 12, 1991, at I IA; Paul
Hoversten, Poll: Jury Did the Right Thing, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 12, 1991, at 2A; David
Margolick, Why Jury in Smith Case Never Heard From 3 Other Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1991, at B14.
70. Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948) (recognizing admissibility of
other acts in prosecution for crimes involving "depraved sexual instinct"); Maynard v. State,
513 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. 1987) (recognizing "depraved sexual instinct" exception); Woods v.
State, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486 (Ind. 1968) (admitting specific acts evidence under "depraved sex-
ual instinct" exception) (citing Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948)); see
State v. Schut, 429 P.2d 126, 128 (Wash. 1967) (recognizing "lustful inclination" exception to
general prohibition against character propensity evidence).
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B. Specific Acts Evidence and the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory
The prohibition against character propensity inferences appears par-
ticularly lax in the area of sex crimes.7 1 While admission of evidence of
other sex crimes initially was limited to those offenses involving the same
parties, 72 the modem trend appears to be to admit such evidence even
when the parties are not the same.73 Some courts, while not expressly
allowing evidence of sex crimes with other victims to show a character
propensity, have sought to find other means of admitting such evi-
dence.74 In so doing, they achieve the same result.7"
Among the state jurisdictions, there appears to be a growing trend
toward creating an absolute exception to character propensity inferences
in the case of sex crimes.76 Even those jurisdictions that do not expressly
71. See United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300, 1303-04 (7th Cir.) (recognizing
trial court's discretion in child abuse cases for admitting prior instances of abuse even when
instances involve different victims), cert denied, 484 U.S. 958 (1987), disapproved on other
grounds, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (specific acts evidence need not be
proven by clear and convincing evidence); Woods, 235 N.E.2d at 486 (admitting specific acts
evidence in cases of sexual child abuse); Schut, 429 P.2d at 128 (admitting specific acts evi-
dence in cases of sex crimes); Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974 & n.4 (Wyo. 1989) (recognizing
"nationally predominant trend" toward greater flexibility in admitting specific acts evidence in
sex crimes); cf. State v. Crossman, 624 P.2d 461, 464 (Kan. 1981) (admitting specific acts
evidence in cases involving "indecent liberties with a child").
72. Woods, 235 N.E.2d at 486; Schut, 429 P.2d at 128.
73. See Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding admission of
evidence of prior rape of different victim proper); People v. Williams, 115 Cal. App. 3d 446,
452, 171 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (1981) (admitting evidence of prior sex offenses involving two
other victims); People v. Webster, 14 Cal. App. 3d 739, 745-47, 93 Cal. Rptr. 260, 263-65
(1971) (holding evidence of other similar assaults admissible where victims were murdered in
course of rape); Lamar v. State, 195 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind. 1964) (permitting evidence of other
improper sex acts of accused); State v. Schlak, 111 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1961) (admitting
evidence of accused's conduct toward others); State v. Bolden, 241 So. 2d 490, 491-92 (La.
1970) (admitting evidence of conduct with minor female other than victim).
74. See Leight, 818 F.2d at 1304 (noting greater latitude in admissibility of specific acts
evidence in child abuse cases); United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding permissible use of specific acts evidence set forth in Rule 404(b) neither exhaustive
nor conclusive), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1003
(3d Cir. 1976) (discussing Rule 404(b)'s expansion of admissibility of specific acts evidence
from rule at common law). But see United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(holding specific acts evidence admissible only in limited circumstances), cer. denied, 440 U.S.
947 (1979).
75. See Leight, 818 F.2d at 1303-04; Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d at 79; Cook, 538 F.2d at
1003.
76. See George v. State, 813 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Ark. 1991) (holding in cases of child abuse
involving depraved sexual instinct, evidence of similar unnatural sex acts admissible); People v.
Deavers, 580 N.E.2d 1367, 1380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding specific acts evidence admissible
under Depraved Sexual Instinct Doctrine to show penchant for sexual conduct charged);
Woods, 235 N.E.2d at 486 (recognizing longstanding case law precedent admitting specific acts
evidence in sex cases); State v. Hubbs, 268 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Iowa 1978) (holding specific acts
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recognize such an exception have effectively recognized one by "expan-
sively interpreting in prosecutions for sex offenses various well-estab-
lished exceptions to the character evidence rule."
7 7
California appears to be one of the few states that has restricted the
use of specific acts evidence in sex crimes in certain circumstances.7 8
California's evidence law has long prohibited the introduction of specific
acts evidence for the purpose of proving criminal disposition or propen-
sity.79 This prohibition has been recognized in the past half century as
necessary because of the danger of the prejudicial effect of such evi-
dence. so The California Supreme Court has extended section 1102 of the
California Evidence Code, making evidence of specific acts of the accused
inadmissible to prove disposition to commit such acts even if the defend-
ant has opened the question by introducing evidence of his good charac-
ter." However, with the adoption of Proposition 8 in 1982,82
California's strict adherence to the prohibition against specific acts evi-
evidence admissible to show lewd and lascivious disposition); State v. Rankin, 181 N.W.2d
169, 171 (Iowa 1970) (holding specific acts evidence admissible to show propensity in sex
crime cases); State v. Holstead, 354 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1977) (admitting similar act evidence
in sex crime case); State v. Kitson, 817 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing
while "depraved sexual instinct doctrine... has been rejected in name, it has been adopted in
fact"); State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing exception
to general prohibition in cases of sex crimes to prove accused's emotional propensity); State v.
Adams, 264 S.E.2d 46, 50 (N.C. 1980) (holding criminal statute constitutional which pros-
cribes unnatural and perverted sexual conduct indicative of depraved sexual instinct).
77. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1336.
78. See People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 233, 241-43, 424 P.2d 947, 954-57, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363,
370-73 (1967) (recognizing use of specific acts evidence in sex crimes as limited to similar
offenses not too remote from charged conduct). For a more thorough examination of the
California rule, see infra notes 256-72 and accompanying text.
79. People v. Lee Dick Lung, 129 Cal. 491, 492-93, 62 P. 71, 71-72 (1900); People v.
Lynch, 122 Cal. 501, 502-03, 55 P. 248, 248 (1898); People v. Dye, 75 Cal. 108, 112-13, 16 P.
537, 539-40 (1888).
80. See People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 351, 359 P.2d 433, 443-44, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 75-
77 (1961).
81. People v. Wagner, 13 Cal. 3d 612, 618-19, 532 P.2d 105, 108-09, 119 Cal. Rptr. 457,
460-61 (1975).
82. Article I, § 28 of the California Constitution (also known as Proposition 8) states, in
pertinent part:
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by
a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evi-
dence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post
conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal
offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect
any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence
Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory or constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONST. art I, § 28.
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dence appears to be weakening.8 3
Under the guise of showing intent, motive, continuing scheme or
plan, and even identity, the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory is becom-
ing an absolute exception to the prohibition against admitting specific
acts evidence to create a character propensity inference.8 4 The theory
permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of specific instances of the
accused's sexual conduct in order to show the accused has a propensity
or proclivity-an "instinct"-for deviant sexual behavior.85 Once estab-
lished, the prosecution is then permitted to argue that as the accused
possesses this inclination for aberrant sexual behavior, he is more likely
to be motivated, to intend or to plan to commit a crime involving sexu-
ally depraved conduct.8 6 Moreover, it is argued, because the accused
possesses this depraved sexual instinct, it is more likely that he commit-
ted the crime charged than another person without such a proclivity.
7
The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory is often couched in terms of the
permissible purposes for admitting specific acts evidence"8 and is also jus-
tified as necessary to assist in the prosecution of sex crimes.8 9 However,
the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory is simply a means of introducing
character propensity evidence despite the prohibition against it.
The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory undermines the prohibition
against evidence offered to create a character propensity inference. If the
rule against using specific acts evidence for the purpose of proving char-
acter is justified, the broad exception for evidence of sexual proclivity
cannot be explained.90 In many areas of our jurisprudence, the law cre-
ates, recognizes and affirms legal fictions91 to serve what the courts and
83. See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
85. Eldridge v. State, 580 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing specific acts
evidence as admissible to show defendant's depraved sexual instinct).
86. Free v. State, 732 S.W.2d 452,455 (Ark. 1987) (holding specific acts evidence of sexual
deviance admissible to prove depraved sexual instinct of accused); Lawrence v. State, 464
N.E.2d 923, 924 (Ind. 1984) (holding evidence of prior rape admissible as circumstantial evi-
dence of guilt of sexual misconduct toward minor female).
87. See, eg., State v. McDaniel, 298 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Ariz. 1956); Free, 732 S.W.2d at
455.
88. See, e.g., State v. Fraction, 782 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding similar-
ity of conduct in child abuse cases is equivalent to common scheme); State v. Christeson, 780
S.W.2d 119, 122-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding evidence of prior sexual conduct with same
victim relevant to show motive of seeking satisfaction of sexual desire from that particular
minor victim).
89. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
90. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1345.
91. Legal fiction, or fiction of law, is an "[a]ssumption of fact made by court as basis for
deciding a legal question. A situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a
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legislatures have deemed to be in the best interests of justice. The reason
for excluding specific acts evidence is not that such evidence lacks proba-
tive value,92 but rather that such evidence is likely to be given improper
weight by the finder of fact.93 In this, the law has created a fiction-a
fiction which is axiomatic to the fundamental principle of our system of
justice94-- that each person approaches every situation independently,
not predestined by "hapless fate" 95 to criminal behavior because of his
character.96 Each defendant stands before his tribunal with a clean rec-
ord regardless of what he has done before and regardless of what type of
person he may be.97 This is the fundamental principle, standing on an
equal plane with the presumption of innocence, that the accused is tried
for what he did, not for who he is.98 The prohibition against specific acts
evidence offered to create a character propensity inference protects this
fundamental goal. However, the differential treatment of sexual procliv-
ity evidence only defeats this rule.
This exception to 404(b) accentuates the conflict between the funda-
matter, though it need not be created improperly." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 320 (6th ed.
1990).
92. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 777 & n.2.
93. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1212.
94. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating part of pre-
sumption of innocence in American jurisprudence is fundamental axiom that accused must be
tried only for what he did and not for who he is); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 48
("Under our accusatory criminal justice system, it is axiomatic that the accused need answer
only for the crime he or she is currently charged with.").
95. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING (Sir George Young trans., Caxton House, Inc. 1946).
This famous tragedy serves as a poignant distinction from American jurisprudence. According
to the story, Oedipus' parents, the King and Queen of Thebes, left Oedipus on a mountain, his
ankles nailed together so that he would die. His parents did this because of the prediction of
the Oracle at Delphi that Oedipus would grow up to kill his father and marry his mother.
However, despite their efforts to save themselves (and Oedipus) from such a horrible fate, a
shepherd had compassion on the child and gave him to the King of a different city who raised
him as his own. Once Oedipus had grown, he too learned of the prediction of the Oracle and
left his adopted royal family to avoid his fate. In so doing, he came across a man of royalty
who gave him great insult. Oedipus killed him. This man was the King of Thebes, his true
father. Later, Oedipus saved the City of Thebes from the curse of the Sphinx and in reward,
was given the hand of Queen Jocasta in marriage. Jocasta was Oedipus' true mother. Thus,
despite all efforts to avoid the prediction of the Oracle, Oedipus' attempts only led him to fulfill
his fate. Fortunately, the criminal defendant is not so shackled by destiny or character in
American jurisprudence.
96. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1345.
97. See supra note 5. While prior convictions are admissible in limited circumstances,
such evidence is not admissible for any character propensity inference purposes. See FED. R.
EVID. 609(a) (evidence of prior conviction of an accused is admissible only "[flor the purpose
of attacking the credibility of [an accused] subject to the restrictions of Rule 403" and only if
prior conviction involved crime of dishonesty or false statement).
98. Foskey, 636 F.2d at 523.
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mental admissibility of all relevant evidence and the concern for a fair
trial of an accused. Under the protection of Rule 403, even relevant evi-
dence is inadmissible if the concerns of prejudice substantially outweigh
the probative value of the evidence.99 Permitting specific acts evidence to
show sexual proclivity of the accused-"evidence of a most inflammatory
type" c--eviscerates these protections as well. Under the current appli-
cation of Rule 404(b), along with the states' interpretation of the prohibi-
tion in their own evidentiary codes, the courts have created inconsistency
in the law. On the one hand, the prohibition against introducing evi-
dence for the purpose of creating character propensity inferences is vocif-
erously alfirmed.10 1 On the other hand, the courts destroy this very
prohibition by creating an exception that effectually swallows the rule.102
III. ANALYSIS
Understanding the application and effect of the Depraved Sexual In-
stinct Theory first requires examination of the concept of character and
propensity inferences.
A. Character Propensity Prohibition: The Theory Behind 404(b)
To fully understand the application of Rule 404(b), and the De-
praved Sexual Instinct Theory, the Rule itself must first be examined.
1. Specific acts evidence may not be admitted to establish character
propensity
a. the prohibition in general
Rule 404(b) expressly prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts from being admitted for the purpose of proving conduct on a partic-
ular occasion.103 The Rule recognizes the importance of being cautious
in using specific acts evidence." 4
The prohibition recognizes the danger of prejudice inherent in this
type of evidence that may otherwise be relevant to the issue of the
99. FED. R. EviD. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence.") (emphasis added).
100. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1345.
101. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
103. FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
104. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 797.
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case.' 5 The Advisory Committee's Note expressly states that the admis-
sibility of any specific acts evidence requires a determination of whether
prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evidence." 6 While the
intent of the Rule appears to require analyzing the use of specific acts
evidence in light of Rule 403,107 the Advisory Committee's Note adds a
limiting factor to the balancing test of Rule 403, namely that balancing
the potential prejudicial effect against the probative value of the evidence
must be made "in view of the availability of other means of proof and
other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule
403."108 Therefore, while Rule 404(b) appears to protect the accused
from specific acts evidence in the same manner that he is protected from
other relevant evidence under Rule 403, this additional factor to the Rule
403 balancing test seems to weigh in favor of the admissibility of such
evidence. 109
Moreover, the rule expressly provides for admitting specific acts evi-
dence in certain circumstances."t 0 The rule states that while specific acts
evidence may not be used to show character and thereby conformity with
that character, there are permissible purposes for introducing such evi-
dence."' The rule lists eight permissible purposes," 2 but from the lan-
guage of the rule this list is not meant to be exclusive,' 13 and as such
there is no need to pigeonhole the evidence into one of these traditional
permissible categories.114 Thus, the permissible purposes allow the intro-
duction of specific acts evidence even if that evidence might create a
character propensity inference. This result might seem incongruous with
the general prohibition, but because the evidence is offered for a permissi-
ble purpose, the mere possibility that the fact finder could use the evi-
dence for the improper purpose does not violate the prohibition." 5
105. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
106. Id.
107. See id. Rule 403 governs the exclusion of relevant evidence because of prejudice and
other factors. For the text of Rule 403, see supra note 99.
108. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
109. See id.
110. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
111. Id.
112. The rule lists as its permissible purposes proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id.
113. See id. ("It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity." (emphasis added)).
114. See Kuhns, supra note 21, at 797.
115. The concerns with evidence of limited admissibility are addressed by Rule 105:
"When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105. Whether
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b. defining other crimes, wrongs or acts
Rule 404(b) is not restricted to the criminal arena, and therefore,
more than prior crimes are considered part of the prohibition. 116 The
language of the Rule supports this conclusion in that the prohibition is
against "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts."
'1 17
In addition, the rules do not define "crimes, wrongs or acts,"
although most cases have interpreted the phrase to mean some type of
"bad act" as opposed to any general conduct.11 Even seemingly innocu-
ous acts are viewed as bad acts because in the context of the case for
which they are introduced, such acts generally reflect adversely on the
accused.119
Failure to define these terms raises the question of the appropriate
standard of proof necessary to establish that the accused actually com-
mitted the prior bad act. While a charge of criminal conduct must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 120 introduction of evidence of that
a jury will, or is even able to properly restrict the application of specific acts evidence to the
permissible purpose as instructed by the court is beyond the scope of this Comment.
116. There appears to be a prevailing pattern among both the federal and state courts to
exclude all forms of character evidence in civil cases when the evidence is employed merely to
support an inference that conduct on a particular occasion was consistent with a person's
character. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988); Reyes v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 589 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1979); Barbieri v. Cadillac Const. Corp., 389 A.2d 1263
(Conn. 1978); Feliciano v. City and County of Honolulu, 611 P.2d 989, 991 (Haw. 1980).
117. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (emphasis added). The question of admissibility of specific acts
evidence in the civil context is most often discussed with regards to "accident proneness"
among automobile drivers. The conflict has arisen from the divergence of opinion on the pro-
priety of trying to prove "accident proneness" through specific acts evidence (which appears to
be improper under the general prohibition of Rule 404(b)) and the psychological studies which
suggest that there are identifiable characteristics which account for the bulk of automobile
accidents. However, there appears to be some suggestion in civil matters outside the arena of
automobile accidents that evidence of departure from a customary standard should be admissi-
ble. The argument seems most strongly asserted in the context of medical malpractice cases
where it is argued the jury should be allowed to consider the number of times a physician
performs a medical procedure in its determination of whether or not that physician performed
an unnecessary procedure on a specific occasion. The application and analysis of 404(b) in the
civil context is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more complete discussion of these
issues see RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHAN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1983); Flemming James Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and
Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REv. 769, 772-75 (1950); Frank E. Maloney & William J. Rish,
The Accident-Prone Driver: The Automotive Age's Biggest Unsolved Problem, 14 U. FLA. L.
REV. 364 (1962); Herman L. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5
VAND. L. REv. 385, 399-400 (1952).
118. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (explaining Rule 404(b) as
prohibiting introduction of specific acts evidence which "adversely reflect[s] on . . .
character").
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 378 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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criminal conduct in a different proceeding does not require the same bur-
den of proof.121 The United States Supreme Court held in Huddleston v.
United States 22 that evidence offered under Rule 404(b) as specific acts
evidence, whether a criminal act or not, need not be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, nor by clear and convincing evidence, and not even by
a preponderance of the evidence.1 23 The preliminary fact question1 2 4 re-
garding such evidence-whether the accused actually committed the spe-
cific acts-is a matter of the trial court's discretion.1 25 As long as the
court determines that there is "sufficient evidence to support a finding by
the jury that the defendant committed the [other] act,"' 126 the evidence of
that other act should be admitted.1 27 The Court stated what quantum of
evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding by the jury that the accused
committed the other act. However, the rule which the Court established
simply put forth Rule 104(b) as the standard by which a trial judge
should make the determination.128 Therefore, as long as the evidence is
more than unsubstantiated innuendo and the jury can reasonably con-
clude that the accused committed the other act, the evidence is
admissible. 129
c. the "other purposes" clause
While the first sentence of Rule 404(b) creates an absolute prohibi-
tion against admitting specific acts evidence for the purpose of showing
character,130 the second sentence explains that there are permissible pur-
poses for introducing specific acts evidence even when such evidence
121. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686.
122. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
123. Id. at 689.
124. Preliminary fact questions are governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), which
provides: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact,
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition." FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
125. See id.
126. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
127. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
128. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
129. Id. The Court stated:
We conclude that a preliminary finding by the court that the Government has
proved the act by a preponderance of the evidence is not called for under Rule
104(a). This is not to say, however, that the Government may parade past the jury a
litany of potentially prejudicial similar acts that have been established or connected
to the defendant only by unsubstantiated innuendo. Evidence is admissible under
Rule 404(b) only if it is relevant.
Id. (footnote omitted).
130. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For the full text of the Rule, see supra note 35.
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might create a character propensity inference. 131 Thus, Rule 404(b) is
viewed as a rule of inclusion consistent with the general principles favor-
ing admissibility. 132 The permissible "other purposes" do not prove
character for the purpose of showing action in conformity therewith.
133
These permissible purposes simply demonstrate that specific acts evi-
dence is admissible when offered to establish the accused's non-character
propensities germane to an issue in the case.'
34
The permissible purposes under this exception include: (1) to estab-
lish motive;135 (2) to show opportunity; 36 (3) to show, without consider-
ing motive, that the accused acted with the requisite intent;137 (4) to
show preparation by completing the story of the crime on trial by placing
it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings;
38
(5) to show the existence of a larger plan, scheme or conspiracy of which
131. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
132. United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir.) ("Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary
rule ... ."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85 (4th
Cir. 1980) (Rule 404(b) follows previous federal practice in adopting inclusionary rule); United
States v. Waldron, 568 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1977) (Rule 404(b) "unequivocally and very
broadly sets out recognition of the admissibility of prior crimes for other purposes including
... identity"), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1147
(9th Cir. 1977) (Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion); United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615, 616
(9th Cir. 1977) (Rule 404(b) represents rule of inclusion).
133. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
134. Generally, the misunderstanding of Rule 404(b) arises from viewing the "other pur-
poses" clause as a list of exceptions to the prohibition-not permissible non-character pur-
poses, but rather character purposes for which evidence is admissible despite the prohibition.
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla.) (discussing permissible purposes as
exceptions to the prohibition), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959); State v. Schlak, 111 N.W.2d
289, 291 (Iowa 1961) (recognizing the "exception" of admitting evidence of accused's other
sexual misconduct); Commonwealth v. Brown, 342 A.2d 84, 90 (Pa. 1975) ("While it is true
that generally evidence of crimes other than the one for which the defendant is being tried is
not admissible, there are certain well-defined exceptions to that rule.") (emphasis added);
James Georges, Note, Other Crimes or Misconduct Evidence-Commonwealth v. Perkins 519
Pa. 149, 546 A.2d 42 (1988), 62 TEMP. L. REV. 771, 774-78 (1989); John McCorvey, Note,
Corroboration or Propensity? An Empty Distinction in the Admissibility of Similar Fact Evi-
dence, 18 STETSON L. Rav. 171, 175-78 (1988).
135. United States v. Wasler, 670 F.2d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cyphers,
553 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977); United States v. Haldeman,
559 F.2d 31, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); People v. Cardenas, 31
Cal. 3d 897, 906, 647 P.2d 569, 573-74, 184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 169-70 (1982).
136. United States v. DeJohn, 638 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1981).
137. United States v. Mitchell, 666 F.2d 1385, 1389-90 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1124 (1982); United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979).
138. United States v. Ulland, 643 F.2d 537, 540-41 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mas-
ters, 622 F.2d 83, 86-87 (4th Cir. 1980); State v. Villavicencio, 388 P.2d 245, 246 (Ariz. 1964);
State v. Dlotter, 142 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Minn. 1966).
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the crime on trial is a part;139 (6) to prove knowledge;" (7) to establish
identity;' and (8) to show absence of mistake or accident. 142 When spe-
cific acts evidence is offered to show a passion or propensity for unusual
and abnormal sexual relations, 43 however, the evidence is nothing more
than character evidence under a different name and should therefore be
inadmissible.
2. The 404(b) analysis
Understanding the theory behind 404(b) requires first understanding
the propensity inference process involved in using specific acts evi-
dence."4 An analysis of the propensity inference approach to specific
acts evidence demonstrates the difficulties encountered in distinguishing
between permissible propensity inferences and the impermissible charac-
ter propensity inference of Rule 404(b).
While several forms of propensity inferences exist, 4 the inferential
process behind them may be divided into three categories: non-propen-
139. United States v. Lewis, 693 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Parnell,
581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979); United States v.
Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 98-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1975); United States v.
Carroll, 510 F.2d 507, 509 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v.
Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586, 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972).
140. United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Her-
nandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607,
611 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
141. United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920
(1980); United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Myers,
550 F.2d 1036, 1046-48 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
142. See United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138, 142 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Witschner, 624 F.2d 840, 842-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); United States v.
Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 67-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963).
143. Woods v. State, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486-87 (Ind. 1968); State v. Crossman, 624 P.2d 461,
464 (Kan. 1981); State v. Schut, 429 P.2d 126, 128 (Wash. 1967).
144. To understand the analysis behind admitting evidence, an inferential chain analysis is
most useful. See Imwinkelried, supra note 6; Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Scholarly and Institutional
Challenges to the Law of Evidence: From Bentham to the ADR Movement, 25 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 835, 849 (1992); Leonard, supra note 38.
145. See Kuhns, supra note 21, at 781-82.
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sity evidence,1 46 non-character propensity evidence 47 and character pro-
146. Non-propensity evidence does not require any inference by the trier of fact. See
Kuhns, supra note 21. Often this type of evidence arises when the prosecution seeks to narrow
the "identifiable group" of persons who could have committed the crime in question. The
most common types of non-propensity evidence arises when specific acts evidence is offered to
show ability or opportunity. In some instances, non-propensity evidence is used to show iden-
tity, although there is a strong argument that such evidence actually involves a propensity
inference of some sort-albeit of the non-character type. See infra notes 149-51 and accompa-
nying text for a more detailed discussion.
147. Rule 404(b)'s prohibition only relates to character propensity inferences. The Rule
expressly states several permissible forms of propensity inferences for which specific acts evi-
dence is admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Professor Imwinkelried emphasizes the use of inferential chain analyses in explaining the
theory of admissibility of evidence. Three steps comprise the analysis: first, we must consider
the item of evidence itself; second, we draw an intermediate inference from that evidence;
third, we draw the ultimate inference-the conclusion-which explains the justification for
admitting the evidence. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 42, 45, 55, 65. Thus, the specific
acts evidence (the evidence offered at trial) leads to the intermediate inference of the accused's
subjective, personal character, disposition or propensity. From this intermediate inference, we
draw the conclusion that the accused acted in conformity with his character during the inci-
dent in question. Id. Professor Leonard refers to this process as "circumstantial proof." Pro-
fessor Leonard explains that circumstantial proof involves a logical relevancy analysis:
"[C]ircumstantial proof of a fact involves the offer of evidence not of the fact of proposition
ultimately sought to be proved, but of some other fact which, if believed, will make that fact or
proposition more or less likely true." Leonard, supra note 38, at 9.
Courts have generally permitted the use of specific acts evidence to show intent and ab-
sence of accident. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text. Often the propensity infer-
ence arises from a neutral act. In theory, introduction of this kind of specific acts evidence
which requires the fact finder to make a propensity inference poses no threat of prejudice.
Such evidence is often used to show that individuals who plan a certain course of action tend
to follow through with those plans. For example, when a prison escapee claims that his escape
was a spontaneous act because of duress, evidence that the prisoner had arranged to have a car
waiting outside the prison wall at the time of the escape is admissible to show the prisoner's
intent. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 790.
Following Professor Imwinkelried's inferential chain analysis, the logical relevancy of the
waiting car would flow as follows: (1) the item of evidence is the waiting car; (2) the interme-
diate inference drawn from the evidence is that people who plan for a car to wait at a desig-
nated location intend to meet that car at the predetermined time and place; (3) the conclusion
is that the prisoner intended to escape and thus did not act spontaneously.
Another example of this type of permissible propensity inference might involve the issue
of the accused's knowledge. The specific acts evidence in such a case requires the propensity
inference that a person who obtains knowledge of some fact tends to retain that knowledge. If
the accused on a prior occasion had possessed a substance which he knew was heroin, evidence
of this prior possession is admissible to rebut the accused's defense in a subsequent case for a
similar possession that he did not know the substance he possessed was heroin. See United
States v. Wixom, 529 F.2d 217, 220 (8th Cir. 1976).
Here, the inferential chain might be as follows: (1) the item of evidence is that the ac-
cused has once possessed a substance which he knew to be heroin; (2) the intermediate infer-
ence drawn is that the accused is familiar with heroin and is more likely to remember the
substance and be able to identify it at a later time; and (3) the conclusion is that the accused
knew that the substance in his possession was heroin at the time in question. The prior knowl-
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pensity evidence. 4
a. non-propensity and non-character propensity evidence
Specific acts evidence offered to show identity, ability or opportunity
does not necessarily create any propensity inference. For example, a
non-propensity inference use of specific acts evidence would be to prove
the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of a crime. 149 Evidence that
the accused had previously burglarized a safe by using some intricate and
highly sophisticated technical device would be admissible to identify the
accused as the perpetrator of a burglary of a safe or vault that was car-
ried out in a similar manner. 50 This type of specific acts evidence is not
introduced to show that the accused is the type of person who breaks into
safes and thus is a "bad person"; it merely demonstrates that the accused
is part of an identifiable "group" of persons who have the ability to com-
mit such an act because of their specialized knowledge or skill.
15 1
edge creates the inference that the accused will be able to recognize heroin at a later time-he
has the wherewithal to know what is and is not heroin.
148. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 782. While Professor Kuhns actually discusses the types of
evidence under five categories, ("traditionally prohibited propensity inferences," "permissible
individualized propensity inferences from a defendant's bad conduct," "permissible genera-
lized propensity inferences from a defendant's bad conduct," "permissible generalized propen-
sity inferences from a defendant's neutral conduct" and "permissible generalized inferences
from the conduct of third persons"), these five are grouped more generally for the purposes of
this Comment to provide a more cursory overview of the analytical theory behind 404(b).
149. See supra note 141.
150. United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 885-86 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989) (regarding prosecution for bank robbery; evidence of attempted burglary of grocery
store admissible to show common method of committing crimes). The federal courts have
permitted use of prior crimes the evidence of which did not demonstrate the same level of
intricate skill or knowledge as set forth in the above example. As long as the prior act can be
linked to the crime charged, the evidence is properly admissible. For example, in Lewis v.
United States, 771 F.2d 454, 456 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1024 (1985), in a case
charging burglary of a post office, evidence that the accused had committed a separate prior
burglary of a garage was held admissible despite the dissimilarity between the two crimes. The
court held that where the accused burglarized the garage in order to take equipment needed
for the burglary of the post office, the prosecution could establish a relevant link between the
prior act and the crime charged. Id.
151. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 786. Of course, it can be argued that this example actually
involves a non-character propensity inference. For example, in order for the fact that the
accused has the specialized skill to be relevant, the trier of fact must believe that a person with
such skill is more likely to use that skill to break into the safe. Professor Imwinkelried consid-
ers this a clear example of a propensity inference, for the trier of fact must make the inference
that the accused has the propensity to employ such a skill in order to conclude that the ac-
cused more likely than not used his skill on the occasion charged. See Imwinkelried, supra
note 20, at 51-52.
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b. character propensity evidence
Specific acts evidence that creates a character propensity inference is
inadmissible.152 The issue of admissibility of specific acts evidence most
frequently arises in the context of a prosecutor's offer to prove that a
criminal defendant has committed various bad acts. Relevance of spe-
cific acts evidence in this context is wholly dependent upon the propen-
sity inference. There are typically three steps in the inferential process of
proof regarding specific acts evidence that creates a character propensity
inference."5 ' First, the fact finder must infer from the specific acts evi-
dence that the accused has some unique propensity not generally held by
the populace at large-a propensity that demonstrates that he is of a
certain character or possesses a certain character trait. Next, the fact
finder must make the inference that a person with such a propensity or
character trait is more likely to act in accordance with that propensity on
any given occasion than a person who does not possess that propensity.
Finally, in the last step of the inferential chain, the fact finder must infer
that this particular character trait is one that will manifest itself
repeatedly. 154
B. Specific Acts Evidence in Sex Crimes
Rule 404(b), as currently applied, prohibits any effort to introduce
evidence of the propensity of a person to act in accordance with a charac-
ter trait associated with a certain prior act.155 However, there appears to
be a general trend in the prosecution of sex crimes to admit evidence of
the accused's sexual proclivities. ' 56 Although it appears that the federal
152. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
153. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 42, 45, 55 and 65; Kuhns, supra note 21, at 783;
Leonard, supra note 38, at 9.
154. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 45, 50-53; Kuhns, supra note 21, at 784; Leonard,
supra note 38, at 9. A simple example of this is a case of assault. Evidence that the accused
has committed other acts of assault is introduced to show that the accused was the assailant in
the case in question. The other act of assault is only relevant because of the propensity infer-
ence. The fact that the accused has been violent on previous occasions leads to the inference
that he is the kind of person who is violent. He has a propensity for violence and therefore is
more likely to act violently on any given occasion than a person who has never before been
violent. Therefore, it is more likely than not that the accused was violent at the particular time
in question. The accused committed a prior act which allows the fact finder to infer that he
has a character trait representative of that act, and therefore the fact finder determines that he
acted consistently with that character trait on a particular occasion. Where the relevancy of
any evidence depends on an assumption about how a person or the populace at large acts, the
assumption creates a character propensity inference. Kuhns, supra note 21, at 782-83.
155. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
156. See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
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courts are more hesitant to admit evidence for this purpose, 157 such evi-
dence will be permitted in the case of repeated sex crimes between the
same parties. 158 This view relies on the theory that evidence is admissible
concerning acts of intercourse between an accused and the complaining
witness prior to the specific acts for which the accused is charged.' 59 The
mental disposition of the accused, at the time of the act charged, is rele-
vant."6 Similarly, evidence that at some prior time the accused pos-
sessed the same mental disposition would also be relevant. 6 ' Therefore,
evidence of prior acts between the same parties is admissible as showing a
disposition to commit the act charged.' 62 The theory itself is based upon
the probability that an emotional predisposition or passion will continue
beyond the prior incident.' 63
The logical relevance analysis would follow this inferential chain:
(1) the item of evidence is that the accused forced the victim to engage in
sexual intercourse on a prior occasion; (2) the intermediate inference
drawn therefrom is that the accused has an abnormal, lustful inclination
for the victim and is more likely to give in to that predisposition and act
on it; (3) thus, the accused is more likely than not to be the one who
forced the victim to engage in sexual intercourse on the charged occa-
sion. Clearly, this chain of reasoning is nothing more than a character
propensity inference chain. As there is evidence that the accused forced
this victim to have sexual intercourse before, the trier of fact concludes
that he must be the type of person who would force a woman to submit
to his sexual desires. Therefore, he must have forced the victim to sub-
mit on this occasion as well. The specific acts evidence would be irrele-
vant without the intermediated inference about the accused's character
or propensity. 164 The difference here, in this inferential chain, is that the
inference that the accused is of an abominable character is made para-
mount. Thus, the accused, who may in fact be a loathsome person, is
found guilty in part because of an inference as to his character.
This is different from a case in which the victim was raped in some
particularly distinctive manner. For example, if the prosecution offered
157. See, eg., United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (specific acts evi-
dence only admissible in limited circumstances), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
158. Bracey v. United States, 142 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 762 (1944);
Hodge v. United States, 126 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1942).





164. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 52.
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evidence that the accused had raped a woman in a particular fashion-
perhaps binding her and gagging her with a sweat sock, raping and
sodomizing her, and then slashing a giant "X" across her back with a
knife-such evidence would be properly admissible against the accused
in a later case involving a similarly perpetrated crime.165 The evidence
would be non-character propensity evidence tending to show the identity
of the perpetrator, or perhaps modus operandi, was more likely than not
that of the accused. 166 Thus, the evidence, though certainly allowing a
character propensity inference-that the accused has a violent and de-
praved sexual inclination-is properly admitted as non-character pro-
pensity evidence when offered for a permissible purpose such as to prove
identity or modus operandi.
While federal courts have recognized the exception in cases of sex
crimes involving the same parties as early as 1944,167 the federal courts
also have recognized that logically the exception should be extended to
include sex offenses involving different parties.1 68 Perhaps this implica-
tion arises from the nature of aberrant sexual conduct. The courts seem
to have been more flexible and lenient in admitting evidence of specific
acts demonstrating a lustful inclination. 69 The older cases from many
state jurisdictions support this same conclusion. 170
1. Application in the federal courts
The federal courts use the "other purposes" clause as the basis for
admitting evidence of an accused's sexual proclivities purportedly for the
165. See, eg., McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir.) (holding that where
man wearing white, see-through bikini swimming suit approached woman sunbathing at beach
and raped her, evidence that accused on two prior occasions, wearing red, see-through bathing
suit, exposed himself to other woman at same beach was admissible to demonstrate manner of
operation, identity and type of clothing worn by accused), cert denied, 459 U.S. 743 (1982);
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959) (holding as
admissible to show identity in trial for attempted rape where attacker had hidden in back seat
of complaining witness's car in a shopping center parking lot, evidence that accused had raped
another woman in same parking lot after hiding in back seat of her car).
166. McGahee, 667 F.2d at 1360.
167. See Bracey, 142 F.2d at 85.
168. McGahee, 667 F.2d at 1360.
169. See Bracey, 142 F.2d at 88. The court stated:
The emotional predisposition or passion involved in raping one little girl would seem
to be the same as that involved in raping another. Evidence of such a crime commit-
ted upon one little girl shows a disposition to commit the same crime upon another,
and the probability that the emotional predisposition or passion will continue is as
great in one case as the other.
Id.
170. See, e.g., State v. Cupit, 179 So. 837, 839 (La. 1938); State v. Shtemme, 158 N.W. 48,
49 (Minn. 1916).
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purpose of showing intent.171 With regard to sex crimes,172 the "intent"
purpose under Rule 404(b) is applicable where, for example in a rape
case, the act is assumed as otherwise proved and the issue is actual intent
to commit the act.'73 In such a case, the prosecution's only goal would
be to prove the specific intent and negate any other intent than the intent
to rape.'74 Thus, specific acts evidence is relevant to negate the claim
that the accused's intent was anything other than to commit the crime in
question.1
75
a the theory in Lovely v. United States
This application of the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory as one of
the permissible "other purposes" of Rule 404(b) has been well established
over the past several decades. For example, in Lovely v. United States 176
the Fourth Circuit examined the general prohibition against character
propensity inferences and the application of the permissible purpose of
showing intent in rape cases.'7 7 Lovely involved an appeal from a life
sentence for rape. The defendant appealed on the grounds of improperly
admitted evidence of a prior rape upon another victim.' 78 Because the
defendant admitted the intercourse, the only issue at trial was whether or
not the victim had consented.' 79 The court in Lovely recognized the De-
praved Sexual Instinct Theory as an exception to the general prohibition
in its explanation of why the trial court had improperly admitted the
evidence of the prior rape. "[E]vidence of other similar offenses is held
admissible for the purpose of establishing intent in cases of assault with
intent to commit rape, and evidence of other offenses of like character is
admissible in prosecutions for crime involving a depraved sexual instinct
"180
171. Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948) (admitting similar offenses
in cases of assault with intent to rape).
172. Sex crimes to which the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory has generally been applied
extends beyond merely rape crimes and encompasses most cases of sexual child abuse, molesta-
tion and even murder in which some sexual perversion was involved. See infra notes 217-26.
173. See Lovely, 169 F.2d at 390.
174. Id. Because the purpose would be to negate any other intent of the accused, there
should be no limitation on the victim. Wigmaore considers a previous rape assault on another
victim as having the same probative value for negating a non-rape intent because such crimes
generally involve satisfying aberrant desires, "and no particular [victim] is essential for this."
See WIGMORE, supra note 19.
175. See WIGMORE, supra note 19.
176. 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
177. Id. at 389.
178. Id. at 387.
179. Id. at 388.
180. Id. at 390 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 25:12971322
DEPRAVED SEXUAL INSTINCT THEORY
The court held that the evidence of the prior rape was improperly
admitted at trial.181 Yet, it appears that the prejudicial effect of the error
might have arisen more from the detail of the evidence rather than purely
from its admission.1"2 Yet the court, while recognizing the applicability
of a Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory as an exception to the general pro-
hibition, adhered to the "established" law that specific acts evidence is
inadmissible in prosecutions for rape.1 3 In explaining this restriction on
the depraved sexual instinct exception, however, the court set the stage
for the very abuse that it sought to avoid. The court observed:
Acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances
which with other circumstances may have a tendency to con-
nect an accused with a crime of that character. The fact that
one woman was raped, however, has no tendency to prove that
another woman did not consent.
It is argued that since the defendant might have been con-
victed of assault with intent to rape under this indictment, it
was proper to admit any evidence that would have been proper
on a prosecution for assault with intent to rape. The answer is
that this was not a prosecution for assault with intent to rape
and every one so understood.8 4
The court recognized that a "perverted sexual instinct" is relevant
to connect an accused with a sexual crime. Thus, the court expressly
stated that if an accused can be shown to have a depraved sexual in-
stinct-a character trait of such an instinct-it is relevant: it has a ten-
dency in reason to link the accused with a crime which involved deviant
sexual conduct.' 8 5 The court, however, implicitly concluded that rape:
181. Id. at 389.
182. The appellate court noted that the trial court permitted the prosecution to offer evi-
dence of the prior rape in specific detail. The appellate court viewed this as requiring the
accused to defend against the prior charge of rape
while his hands were full defending the charge contained in the indictment, and the
jury was necessarily given the impression, although his character had not been placed
in issue, that he was a bad man who had been guilty of other crimes and who might
well be convicted on that account.
Id. The court emphasized the importance of the prohibition against character propensity
inferences:
The rule which thus forbids the introduction of evidence of other offenses having no
reasonable tendency to prove the crime charged, except in so far as they may estab-
lish a criminal tendency on the part of the accused, is not a mere technical rule of
law. It arises out of the fundamental demand for justice and fairness which lies at the
basis of our jurisprudence.
Id.
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(1) does not fall within the definition of depraved sexual conduct, and (2)
that forcing a woman to have sexual intercourse on one occasion has no
tendency in reason to show that the accused would force another woman
to have sexual intercourse on a different occasion.
18 6
This reasoning is inherently flawed. The court errs in failing to rec-
ognize that rape is aberrant sexual behavior. The simple fact that our
society punishes this behavior should demonstrate that rape is considered
unacceptable conduct. 117 The relevance is clear-the prior crime creates
a character propensity. Logically, a jury would conclude that the ac-
cused will act in accordance with that character propensity.188 Herein
lies the danger-the jury convicts because the accused is a bad person-
the type of person who would force a woman to have sexual intercourse.
The jury convicts the accused because of his character and not because
the prosecution has met its burden of proof.189
The court in Lovely improperly emphasized the relevancy question.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the relevancy of
character evidence in Michelson v. United States. 9 The Court held that
the issue is not one of relevancy. Character evidence is inadmissible not
186. See id.
187. Perhaps because the case was decided nearly half a century ago, the court did not
consider rape a perversion-that rape goes beyond merely a lustful inclination toward another,
and that it might demonstrate a need of the perpetrator to perform violent acts upon women,
or that the perpetrator has the need to degrade, humiliate and terrify his victims as part of his
sexual gratification. Perhaps when expressed in these terms, recognizing rape as depraved
sexual behavior becomes more evident.
188. The simple fact that the accused forced one woman to have sexual intercourse demon-
strates that the accused is not beyond using force to achieve his goal-be it sexual gratification
through fear and intimidation or merely a need to commit acts of violence against women. For
example, the Indiana Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923 (Ind. 1984),
that evidence of prior rape was admissible as circumstantial evidence of the accused's guilt of
sexual misconduct toward a minor female. The court stated:
In this case, appellant was twenty-two years old in 1959 and forty-four years old
in 1981. Throughout this span of years, a man normally maintains an active sexual
interest in and at least some degree of sexual aggression toward women. Achieving
sexual connection with a nine year-old child is a sexually aggressive act, accom-
plished by overpowering and intimidation. It is similar in character to the sexual
aggressive attitudes accompanying an approach to a woman by force, threat and en-
gendering fear. Since the male sexual attitude normally continues and persists
through these years, the passage of time alone would not end any strand of relevance
having it as its basis.
Id. at 924.
In Lovely the court's conclusion that rape of one woman is irrelevant to the issue of
another woman's consent assumes a character trait of the accused that he is not the type of
person who would force a woman to have sexual intercourse. Yet, the fact that the accused
used force on a prior occasion demonstrates that he might very well be the type of person to
use force.
189. Lovely, 169 F.2d at 390.
190. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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because it is irrelevant but rather because it creates the danger of weigh-
ing too greatly with the jury and thereby creating a prejudice against the
accused. 191 As a result, the defendant is denied a fair opportunity to
defend against the particular charge.192 Thus, in Lovely, the court's con-
clusion was erroneous-the prior rape was relevant through a character
propensity inference.
1 93
The court in Lovely refused to define rape as aberrant sexual behav-
ior and concluded that one rape has no relevancy on the issue of another
woman's consent.1 94 Therefore, the prior rape was held inadmissible-
not because of any prejudicial effect the specific acts evidence might bring
to bear or because the evidence might violate the general prohibition
against character propensity inferences-but rather because the court
concluded that the evidence was simply irrelevant.1 9 By limiting its
analysis merely to the definition of Depraved Sexual Instinct, and in fail-
ing to recognize the relevancy of the prior rape from a character propen-
sity standpoint, the court set the stage for the abuse of the Depraved
Sexual Instinct exception. As long as the crime can be defined as de-
praved sexual conduct the exception would apply, and despite the char-
acter propensity inference the prior act would be relevant to connect the
accused With any crime of that nature.1 96 By excluding the evidence on
grounds of irrelevancy, the court left open whether the evidence would
have been admissible if it had been found relevant. Lovely has never been
overturned.
b. the federal courts' analysis under the exception
As Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) codified the common law prohi-
bition against character propensity inferences, 197 case law interpretation
seems to have continued to set the stage for an exception based on the
Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory-an exception so broad that it swal-
lows the rule. More recent cases have emphasized that as long as the
specific acts evidence is relevant to an actual issue in the case, as long as
it can fit one of the recognized permissible purposes, and as long as the
probative value is not substantially outweighed by any potential for un-
due prejudice, the evidence is admissible. 98
191. Id. at 475-76.
192. Id. at 476.
193. But because of the danger of prejudice, perhaps it should have been excluded anyway.
194. Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948).
195. Id. at 388.
196. See id. at 390.
197. Leonard, supra note 38, at 22.
198. See United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 193 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972
June 1992] 1325
1326 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule and as such follows the federal
practice of admitting all evidence of other crimes that is relevant to the
issue in trial. 199 The analysis under Rule 404(b) therefore starts from the
premise that if the specific acts evidence is relevant it should be admissi-
ble. Consequently, because specific acts evidence will at least create a
character propensity and therefore be relevant, character propensity evi-
dence would be admissible. Yet, as a matter of policy, Rule 404 prohibits
evidence when offered for the purpose of creating such a character pro-
pensity inference, and thus, the evidence despite its relevance is
excluded. 2 °
The analysis does not end here. The next step is to determine if
there is a permissible purpose for the evidence. As long as the evidence
has some other permissible purpose, the evidence, though it allows an
impermissible character propensity inference, is admissible.20'
Although the permissible purposes under Rule 404(b) might permit
an improper character propensity inference, a limiting instruction from
the judge protects the accused from the improper use of the evidence by
the jury. 2 Nevertheless, the courts have encouraged the broad applica-
tion of the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory by couching the theory in
terms of the permissible purposes for specific acts evidence. Thus, any
act of an accused that for some special reason tends to link the accused to
the crime charged becomes admissible under the rule.20 a
Federal courts seem to recognize the general prohibition against
character propensity inferences but in a very flexible manner. The prob-
lem is not one of "pigeon-holing" specific acts evidence into a permissible
purpose under Rule 404(b); rather, the difficulty arises in the balancing
test. On one side, the court must consider the need for the specific acts
evidence in light of the issues at trial, the other evidence available to the
prosecution, the persuasive value of the evidence that the other acts were
committed and that the accused was the actor,2° and the strength or
(1979); United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. DeFillipo,
590 F.2d 1228, 1240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
199. United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1980).
200. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
201. Masters, 662 F.2d at 86; United States v. Waldron, 568 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir.
1977).
202. See Lyles, 593 F.2d at 190 (providing jury with cautionary instruction regarding use of
specific acts evidence sufficient to protect accused against undue prejudice).
203. See Smith v. Wainwright, 568 F.2d 362, 363-64 (5th Cir. 1978).
204. This is a very low threshold standard under Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
689 (1988) (stating specific acts evidence need not be proved by preponderance of evidence
although proof may not consist only of unsubstantiated innuendo).
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weakness of the specific acts evidence."0 5 The court must weigh these
factors against the degree to which the evidence is unduly prejudicial.20 6
An exception to Rule 404(b) based on the Depraved Sexual Instinct
Theory demonstrates the ease with which additional exceptions can be
created while raising the concerns of the grave prejudicial potential of
such an exception. The federal courts, while not clearly applying the
Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory to rape,20 7 recognize the necessity of
the exception with regards to child abuse cases. 0" For example, in
United States v. Leight'2 o the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized that some courts admit specific acts evidence in child abuse cases
more readily because of the difficulties commonly encountered in proving
cases of child abuse.210 In Leight the defendant was convicted for mur-
dering her infant son.21 On appeal, the defendant argued that similar
acts evidence introduced at trial turned the trial into an attack on her
character and that she was convicted on the basis of an impermissible
character propensity inference.2" 2 The court rejected this notion, articu-
lating the greater policy concerns arising in child abuse cases.213
The court in Leight emphasized the necessity of admitting specific
acts evidence for the purpose of circumstantially proving the crime
charged. "In child abuse prosecutions, there are usually no eyewitnesses
to identify the source of the injuries. Rather, such prosecutions are com-
monly built upon circumstantial evidence showing a pattern of repeated
injuries suggesting child abuse." ' 4 As a result, the court stated that a
proper analysis of the propriety of admitting specific acts evidence in
cases of child abuse is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.215
This extension and flexibility increases the danger of the abuse that
exceptions to Rule 404(b) permit-particularly the Depraved Sexual In-
205. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979
(1974).
206. Id.; United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
968 (1973); see, e.g., Dining v. United States, 328 F.2d 512, 515 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1003 (1964).
207. See supra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
209. 818 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958 (1987).
210. Id. at 1303.
211. Id. at 1299.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1303-04.
214. Id. at 1301.
215. Id. at 1302.
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stinct exception.216 In United States v. Hadley217 the trial court took on
the task of finding a permissible purpose for evidence under Rule
404(b). 218 An elementary school teacher was charged with aggravated
sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact with a minor.219 The defense
argued that the specific acts evidence of prior abuse did not speak to a
material element in the case.220 The prosecution offered no permissible
purpose for the testimonial evidence of the prior abuse, but the court on
its own initiative articulated a possible permissible purpose for which the
evidence may be admitted.221 The appellate court found no abuse of dis-
cretion222 in the trial court forcing the admissibility of the evidence in
recognition of the policy concerns surrounding child abuse cases.223
Federal courts appear gravely concerned with the prosecution of
child abuse crimes and therefore appear far more willing to admit specific
acts evidence under the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory. The court in
Leight held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding
that the probative value of the prior acts of child abuse was not out-
weighed by any unfair prejudice, even though such prior acts were "of a
reprehensible character. '224 However, precisely because of the nature of
the crimes involved, the danger for prejudice is extraordinarily high. The
same is certainly true with respect to sex offenses-crimes that should
universally be recognized as being of a reprehensible character. Yet, be-
cause of their distinctive nature, sex crimes would more readily fall
216. For example, in United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 979 (1974), where the defendant was convicted of infanticide, the trial court admitted
evidence of prior incidents where children died from similar causes. The defendant's child had
died from cyanosis, which is a sign of oxygen deprivation-usually the result of smothering.
Id. at 129-30. The court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of twenty other
episodes of cyanosis among nine different children to whom the defendant had access or of
whom she had custody. Seven of these other children died as a result of the cyanosis. Id. at
130. However, no evidence was introduced to show that the defendant had ever been impli-
cated in the other deaths, except for one. Id. at 133. The trial court admitted the evidence
because of the greater need in such cases for evidence. See id. at 135. The court of appeals
then employed a balancing test to determine if the necessity of the evidence outweighed any
undue prejudice. Id. Thus, loosely related evidence was made admissible because of the difli-
culty that the prosecution faced in proving its case.
217. 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1261 (1992).
218. See id. at 851.
219. Id. at 850.
220. Id. at 851.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id. The court also held that the specific acts evidence was properly admitted under
the Huddleston threshold test as the prior victims were able to testify in detail regarding the
prior acts. Id. However, there was no corroboration of either witness's testimony. Id.
224. Id. at 1304.
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within the definition of other acts that for some special reason-unique-
ness of the depravity of the offense-tends to link an accused with the
crime charged.225 Not only are all sex crimes similarly reprehensible, but
they share the same difficulty in their prosecution.2 6 While society is
legitimately concerned about prosecuting such crimes, there is no justifi-
cation for ignoring the highly prejudicial impact that specific acts evi-
dence will have on the jury. The exception based on the Depraved
Sexual Instinct Theory especially emphasizes the problems of prejudice
because the very nature of the offense makes the evidence of prior acts
more prejudicial.
2. Application among the states
Several state courts have taken the admissibility of an accused's sex-
ual proclivities one step further than the federal courts by creating an
express exception to the rule.227 The state jurisdictions that do not ex-
pressly recognize the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory in effect follow it
as an exception by interpreting the existing exceptions broadly in cases
involving sex crimes.228
a. the Michigan example
The Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Oliphant 229 addressed the
propriety of the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory. The case represents a
vivid example of the problems inherent in the application of the excep-
tion and the semantic games courts appear ready to play to justify the use
of character propensity inferences. In Oliphant the defendant was
225. See Smith v. Wainwright, 568 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1978).
226. This difficulty is that typically no other percipient witness exists other than the accused
and the prosecuting witness, and often little objective evidence is available at trial.
227. See Woods v. State, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486 (Ind. 1968); State v. Rankin, 181 N.W.2d
169, 171 (Iowa 1970); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 205 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964);
State v. Golladay, 470 P.2d 191, 204 (Wash. 1970) overruled in part on other grounds by State
v. Arndt, 550 P.2d 1328 (Wash. 1976).
228. See, eg., Critchlow v. State, 346 N.E.2d 591, 597-98 (Ind. 1976) (admitting evidence
of subsequent act for purpose of showing common scheme or plan in prosecution for sodomy,
rape and kidnapping although subsequent crime did not involve sodomy or rape; court stated
that jury could conclude that but for police intervention, woman would have suffered similar
fate); State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965) (stating admission of evidence of prior
molestation of children was proper in case charging indecent liberties with minor; conviction
reversed on other grounds); State v. Johnson, 371 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1962) (admitting evidence
of subsequent misconduct to show common scheme or plan in cases involving indecent liber-
ties with child); Hendrickson v. State, 212 N.W.2d 481, 481-83 (Wis. 1973) (articulating policy
of granting greater latitude of proof as to other similar occurrences in cases of sex crimes).
229. 250 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1976).
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charged with forcible rape.230 After a mistrial arising from a hung jury,
the defendant was convicted in a second trial in which the court allowed
evidence that the defendant had committed rape in a similar manner on
three previous occasions. 23 The manner in which the defendant com-
mitted these rapes demonstrated that he had a strong understanding of
the effect of certain forms of evidence in criminal trials- especially re-
garding the credibility of the victim. 232 The rapes were staged to make it
appear that the victim consented in each case. The initial encounter was
friendly, and in each instance, the victim removed her own clothes (albeit
because of threats made by the defendant). Thus, there was no evidence
of any initial struggle or violence.233 Moreover, in two instances, the
defendant gave the victim information about his identity, such as his
name, address and car license number.234 Such information tended to
lessen the credibility of the victims when they reported the incident.235
On the night of the alleged fourth rape, the defendant even went so far as
to go to the police himself claiming that he had an argument with the
victim and was concerned about what she might do as a result.236 This
detailed orchestration of his crimes presents a picture of a defendant who
a jury could easily believe is guilty and yet might be able to escape con-
viction because of his ability to manipulate evidence.
The court appears to have justified its decision to admit the evidence
of the prior rapes through semantic manipulation. The court concluded
that the specific acts evidence was admissible on the issue of the victim's
lack of consent because such evidence had a tendency in logic to show a
plan or scheme by which the defendant made it difficult for the prosecu-
tion to show the victim's lack of consent.23 7 In dissent, however, Justice
230. Id. at 445.
231. Id. at 445-46.
232. See id. at 450.
233. Id. at 445-49.
234. Id. at 448.
235. Id. at 449.
236. Id. at 446.
237. See id. at 449. The court also stated:
[Trhe People did not offer the prior acts to prove prior rapes, or that the defendant is
a bad man with criminal propensities. The People offered the prior acts to show the
scheme.., employed by the defendant in raping the complainant in a manner and
under circumstances which gave the appearance of consent should he meet with
resistance.
Id. at 450. This explanation is flawed in its reasoning. As each prior incident was distinct and
separate, there is no logical inferential chain which demonstrates the relevance of the prior
rapes to the claim of continuing plan or scheme. Thus, the proper, and probably only, inferen-
tial chain would be as follows: one who manipulates evidence to create the appearance of
consent during a rape is more likely to manipulate evidence in a similar fashion than is one
who has never before so manipulated evidence (and arguably would not know how to do so).
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Levin recognized that the majority was side-stepping the propensity
problem. Justice Levin dissented because the majority failed to state any
basis for creating a justifiable exception to the general rule against the
admission of specific acts evidence. 238 He focused primarily on the dan-
gers of recognizing an exception that truly underlay the court's deci-
sion-one which essentially articulates the Depraved Sexual Instinct
Theory.
239
In Oliphant the Michigan Supreme Court appeared unwilling to pay
the price of sacrificing what is arguably just for society for the principles
of justice embodied in the exclusionary rules. However, in so doing, the
court only obscured its true intentions thereby making the rule arising
from the decision more difficult to understand and apply.
b. the Florida example
In Florida the specific acts evidence rule is derived primarily from
the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Williams v. State.2" In Wil-
liams the defendant attacked a woman in her car in which he had been
hiding.241 He claimed to have mistaken the car for his own and was only
taking a nap in the back seat.2 42 The prosecution offered evidence of a
prior occurrence in which a young girl found the defendant in the back
seat of her car, screamed and scared him off. This other incident oc-
curred in the same parking lot as the occasion charged, and the defend-
ant, upon being apprehended by the police, claimed he had mistaken the
car for his brother's and was only taking a nap.24 3 The court held the
specific acts evidence admissible. 2 "
Therefore, the accused must have manipulated the evidence on the occasion in question. Thus,
the complaining witness more likely did not give her consent to the sexual intercourse. This is
another example of an inferential chain showing that the relevance of the other incidents of
rape are only relevant to create a character propensity inference-the accused is the type of
person who will manipulate the evidence to make it appear that his victims consented.
238. Id. at 457 (Levin, J., dissenting).
239. See id. (Levin, J., dissenting). Justice Levin stated:
The evidence that Oliphant is a rapist is inadmissible to prove a character trait or
propensity to commit the charged offense to support an inference that he may have
raped the complainant. Such evidence, while probative of a propensity to use force
to have sexual intercourse if advances are resisted, is indistinguishable from what
may not be proven, propensity to rape.
Id. (Levin, J., dissenting). However, Justice Levin explained that such evidence is indeed pro-
bative. "A man's propensity to use force is not probative of non-consent; it shows rather how
he may react or what may occur if the woman does not consent." Id. (Levin, J., dissenting).
240. 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cerL denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959).
241. Id. at 656.
242. Id. at 657.
243. Id. at 657-58.
244. Id.
June 1992] 1331
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1297
The court in Williams held that relevant evidence is admissible if
offered for any other reason than to show bad character or propensity.245
Florida courts have freely applied the Williams rule in cases involving
sexual abuse of minors.2" Some Florida courts have gone so far as to
expressly recommend that the legislature modify its rule prohibiting the
introduction of specific acts evidence for the purpose of showing charac-
ter247 to expressly permit such evidence for the purpose of showing pro-
pensity in cases involving sexual abuse of minors.248
Proponents of this move argue that specific acts evidence in cases
involving sex crimes is proper because of the belief that there is a strong
tendency among sex offenders to repeat such offenses. 249 To hold this
belief, however, is to abandon the prohibition against character propen-
sity inferences altogether, for this belief is the same as the belief that all
people accused of sex crimes have a natural propensity for aberrant sex-
ual behavior.
Florida's District Court of Appeal allowed specific acts evidence in
Heuring v. State 25 0 to show a pattern of criminality on the part of the
accused.25 1 The Florida Supreme Court, however, rejected this rationale
in favor of admitting the evidence as relevant to corroborate the victim's
testimony and to bolster her credibility. 25 2 The court recognized the
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Cotita v. State, 381 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding in case of
lewd and lascivious assault upon five-year-old daughter, evidence of accused's assaults upon
neighborhood children admissible to show pattern of criminality), petition denied, 392 So. 2d
1373 (Fla. 1981); Cantrell v. State, 193 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding in case
of lewd and lascivious assault on eight-year-old girl, evidence of other assaults on children in
accused's neighborhood admissible to show accused's course of conduct); Gossett v. State, 191
So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding in case of assault and rape of fourteen-year-old
girl, evidence of similar assaults upon same victim by accused admissible to show pattern of
criminality).
247. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2) (West 1979) (similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b)).
248. See, e.g., State v. Rush, 399 So. 2d 527, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
249. See id. ("It is suspected that an in-depth study of such incidents would demonstrate
that the actions of the aggressor constitute a pattern of conduct rather than an isolated
incident.").
250. 495 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), vacated, 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1987).
Heuring involved a case where the accused was charged with four counts of sexual battery:
two against his step-daughter and two against his step-son. Two other counts were severed,
and the fourth count was dropped altogether. The accused only stood trial on the initial three
counts. The state sought to introduce evidence of sexual battery of the accused's daughter-an
incident that occurred nearly twenty years before. The state also sought to introduce evidence
of lewd and lascivious assaults by the accused on three other children. The accused was con-
victed on two counts, and the appellate court affirmed. Id.
251. Id.
252. Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987).
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problems inherent in sex crimes against minors: typically the victim
knows the perpetrator and is therefore more easily intimidated by his
presence in the courtroom; the victim is often the only witness; cor-
roborating evidence is usually scarce; and most often the credibility of
the witness is the primary issue.23 Thus, the court upheld the appellate
court's determination that the specific acts evidence was properly admit-
ted, though on a different theory, because the strict test governing such
evidence had been relaxed in such cases.254 The effect of this decision,
though, is the same as if the court simply held that an absolute exception
to the prohibition against character propensity evidence exists for cases
255involving sex crimes.
c. the California view
California cases seem to focus on a balancing of probative value and
potential for prejudice in determining the admissibility of specific acts
evidence.25 6 While the California Evidence Code expressly prohibits ad-
mitting specific acts evidence to prove character propensity,25 7 in cases
involving sex crimes California case law has recognized a limited excep-
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. For a more thorough discussion of Florida's rules regarding specific acts evidence and
Heuring v. State, see John McCorvey, Note, Corroboration or Propensity? An Empty Distinc-
tion in the Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence, 18 STETSON L. REv. 171 (1988).
256. People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 315, 169 P.2d 924, 929 (except when showing merely
criminal disposition, relevant specific acts evidence is admissible even if revealing commission
of other offenses; evidence must tend logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to estab-
lish material fact), cert denied, 329 U.S. 790 (1946); People v. Donnell, 52 Cal. App. 3d 762,
774, 125 Cal. Rptr. 310, 317 (1975) (defining general test of admissibility: whether evidence
tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to establish material fact, whether evi-
dence embraces commission of another crime or not, whether similar or not and whether part
of single design or not); People v. Maler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 973, 980, 100 Cal. Rptr. 650, 653-54
(1972) (applying California Evidence Code § 352 test for admissibility to evidence under Cali-
fornia Evidence Code § 1101).
257. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1992) provides, in full:
(a) Except as provided in this section and in sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of
a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her con-
duct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occa-
sion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such
as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual
act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that
the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.
(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to sup-
port or attack the credibility of a witness.
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tion to the prohibition.2"8 Nevertheless, California case law seems to
have created some confusion regarding the admissibility of evidence of
this kind.
While California Evidence Code section 1101 expressly prohibits ad-
mitting evidence for the purpose of creating a character propensity infer-
ence,259 the courts have invariably employed a balancing test26° similar
to that under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.261 The confusion appears to
arise from the inconsistency in the courts' application of both the prohi-
bition and the limited exception. However, California courts have also
held that, in cases involving sex crimes, evidence of other offenses that
are not too remote and involve the same victim is admissible under a
form of the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory-such evidence is admissi-
ble to show a lewd disposition of the accused.262
California also appears more willing to expand this exception in
cases involving sexual abuse of minors. In People v. Callan 263 the court
258. See People v. Sylvia, 54 Cal. 2d 115, 351 P.2d 781, 4 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1960) (holding
evidence of other sex offenses with same victim, not too remote, admissible to show lewd dispo-
sition or intent of accused toward victim); People v. Stewart, 181 Cal. App. 3d 300, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 252 (1986) (holding trial for attempted incest and oral copulation with person under 18,
evidence of uncharged sexual offenses by accused properly admitted to show accused's lewd
disposition toward victim); People v. Callan, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1101, 220 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1985)
(evidence of uncharged sexual conduct with child admissible as tending to show continuing
plan or design by accused to use minor females of his own household to satisfy sexual gratifica-
tions and wants).
259. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1992). See supra note 257 for the text of
§ 1101.
260. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924 (applying California Evidence Code § 352 to ques-
tion of admissibility of specific acts evidence); Maler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 973, 100 Cal. Rptr. 650
(stating California Evidence Code § 352 applies to § 1101 specific acts evidence).
261. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. The California
equivalent of the Federal Rule is found in California Evidence Code § 352: "The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1991); see also BERNARD S. JEFFERSON, II CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
BENCHBOOK § 33.6, at 1203 (2d ed. 1982).
262. Sylvia, 54 Cal. 2d at 120, 351 P.2d at 785, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The California Supreme
Court also held in Sylvia that where acts indisputably show an "evil intent" and the accused
does not specifically raise the issue of intent in his defense, evidence of specific acts should only
be admitted when they involved the same victim-the prosecuting witness. Id. However, this
narrow exception is arguably expanded where the other acts are not too remote, are similar in
kind to the offense charged and are committed with persons similar to the prosecuting witness.
See JEFFERSON, supra note 261, at 1212.
263. 174 Cal. App. 3d 1101, 220 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1985).
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held that evidence of uncharged sexual conduct with a child was admissi-
ble as tending to show a continuing plan or design by the accused to use
minor females of his own household to satisfy his sexual gratifications
and wants.26 While the court couched its holding in terms of one of the
permissible purposes for introducing specific acts evidence,265 there is lit-
tle difference between holding that such evidence may be admitted to
show a plan to fulfill a depraved sexual desire or holding that the evi-
dence is admissible to show that the accused has such a depraved sexual
desire with which he acted in conformity.
Moreover, California appears more willing to allow specific acts evi-
dence under a narrow version of the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory
provided such evidence is strong enough. In People v. Stewart 266 the ac-
cused was convicted of attempted incest and oral copulation with a mi-
nor.267 On appeal, the court held that evidence of uncharged acts
allegedly committed by the accused was admissible to show the accused's
lewd disposition toward the victim where the victim's testimony of the
prior acts was corroborated by nine sexually explicit photographs of the
accused and the victim.
2 68
Thus, despite the express language of section 1101 of the California
Evidence Code,269 prohibiting the introduction of specific acts evidence
for the purpose of creating a character propensity inference, California,
while not recognizing an absolute exception under the Depraved Sexual
Instinct Theory, appears willing to side-step the prohibition under a
more limited exception in sex crime cases.270 This presents the same
danger as if California simply recognized an absolute exception to the
general prohibition because section 1101 already employs the balancing
test weighing prejudicial effect against probative value.271 Even when ap-
264. Id. at 1110, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
265. California Evidence Code § 1101 follows the same "other purposes" exception as Fed-
eral Rule 404(b): "Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident)."
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1992); see FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
266. 118 Cal. App. 3d 300, 226 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1986).
267. Id. at 302, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
268. Id.
269. See supra note 257.
270. However, at least one court has held that in cases involving sex crimes, evidence of
uncharged offenses is properly admissible to show sexual passion for a particular individual
because in such cases the exclusion of specific acts evidence under § 1101 is inapplicable in
such cases. People v. Barney, 143 Cal. App. 3d 490, 192 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1983).
271. People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 528 P.2d 752, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1974) (determining
admissibility of specific acts evidence lies within sound discretion of trial judge weighing pro-
bative value of such evidence against prejudicial effect); see also JEFFERSON, supra note 261.
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plied narrowly or couched in terms of one of the permissible purposes,
California's application of the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory presents
the same problem as the absolute exception of other states: specific acts
evidence is introduced solely to show that the accused possesses a repre-
hensible character. Yet the California courts hide this by straining their
analysis to make the evidence appear to fall within one of the permissible
purposes. Can a jury reasonably be expected to distinguish between a
permissible purpose and the impermissable purpose of using highly prej-
udicial evidence of prior aberrant sexual behavior to draw an impermissi-
ble character propensity inference?272
272. Another element that exists in the California exception, an element that perhaps in-
creases the danger of eradicating the prohibition against character propensity inferences in sex
crimes altogether, is the admissibility of expert psychological testimony regarding the ac-
cused's mental state. In People v. Jones, the accused was convicted of sexually abusing his
nine-year-old niece. 42 Cal. 2d 219, 221, 266 P.2d 38, 41 (1954). On appeal, Jones argued that
the conviction should be reversed because the trial court refused to admit the defense expert's
psychological testimony regarding Jones's psychological profile. Id. at 222, 266 P.2d at 41.
The defense expert's conclusion, based on two examinations of Jones, was that Jones was not a
sexual deviant and that "he [was] incapable of having the necessary intent to be lustive, either
for himself or to satisfy the lusts of a child of nine and a half years of age." Id. The defense
sought to offer this evidence to show that Jones had a normal state of mind of a person not
prone to commit such an act as that with which he was charged. Id.
The penal code section under which Jones was charged required proof of the specific
intent to arouse, appeal, or gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of the person. Id. at
223, 266 P.2d at 41. The California Supreme Court stated that the statutory provisions con-
cerning persons who commit sex offenses against minors demonstrated a legislative conclusion
that such persons are more likely to commit such sex crimes than persons without such
propensities. Id. at 223, 266 P.2d at 42. The court stated:
Evidence that a person has no such disposition is analogous to that in regard to
character, for it bears upon the probability of the innocence of the accused. From
evidence which tends to prove that a person is not a sexual psychopath, an inference
reasonably may be drawn that he did not commit the [sexual offense charged].
Id. at 224-25, 266 P.2d at 42. The legislature created a requirement that all persons convicted
of such sex crimes against minors be subject to a psychological determination of sexual psy-
chopathy under California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 6307-09. CAL. WELFARE &
INST. CODE §§ 6307-09 (West 1984). Because of this requirement, the California Supreme
Court held that the trial court should have permitted Jones to offer the expert testimony to
show that he did not have such a disposition. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d at 225, 266 P.2d at 42.
Some courts have interpreted Jones to permit expert psychiatric evidence only on the
issue of intent and not as permitting the accused to offer such evidence to show good character.
See, eg., People v. Taylor, 220 Cal. App. 2d 212, 33 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1963), disapproved on
other grounds, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
However, Jones may be interpreted to permit the introduction of expert psychological testi-
mony by the state once the defense has done so. Thus, while the accused would still control
whether such character evidence would be admitted at all, by choosing such a strategy of
attacking the charge, the accused might be opening the door to the very kind of highly prejudi-
cial character evidence which, arguably, an absolute prohibition against evidence creating a
character propensity inference would prevent.
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V. RECOMMENDATION
The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory represents one of the clearest
examples of the problems that arise when the permissible purposes for
introducing specific acts evidence is misapplied. The current application
of Rule 404(b) by the courts has liberalized the extent to which specific
acts evidence is generally admissible.2 3 A competent prosecutor seeking
to introduce specific acts evidence against the accused has only a minimal
burden before such evidence would be admitted. The minimal relevance
hurdle of Rule 401,274 along with the Huddleston standard of proof re-
quired to show that the accused committed the other acts,275 seems to
contribute to the proliferation of cases in which courts rely on the De-
praved Sexual Instinct Theory to admit specific acts evidence improperly.
As the Federal Rules of Evidence serve as a model for the state rules of
evidence, and because Rule 404(b) is a codification of the common law, a
proper understanding and strict application of Rule 404(b) is essential to
preserve the protection against character propensity inferences at the fed-
eral and state court levels. With the number of state and federal courts
that seem willing to adopt, if not as an absolute exception, variations of
the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory, the rule against introducing spe-
cific acts evidence for the purpose of creating a character propensity in-
ference appears in danger of being all but wiped clear from the books. If
this trend continues, other exceptions just as damaging as the Depraved
Sexual Instinct Theory are bound to find a home in the "other purposes"
clause of Rule 404(b) until the rule will no longer offer any substantive
protection against the use of specific acts evidence.276
273. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988); Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 1978).
274. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EvID. 401 (emphasis added).
275. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
276. In 1990 Congress proposed an amendment to Rule 404(b), adding a pretrial notice
requirement for use of specific acts evidence in criminal cases. The amendment took effect on
December 1, 1991.
Under the new amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon re-
quest by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
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The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory has been used to take advan-
tage of the misunderstood and misapplied theory of Rule 404(b). Con-
cerns with prosecuting sex crimes, the difficulties in proof, and the
heinous nature of these offenses have led many states and some federal
courts to seek ways to admit additional evidence in such cases.277 After
the prosecution has met its minimal burden regarding the specific acts
evidence, the accused's best, and most likely his only, argument for ex-
clusion is that the evidence though relevant is prejudicial, distracting and
time-consuming.27 Rule 403's balancing test may be the only protection
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Rule 404(b) is one of the most often cited rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R.
EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note. Congress appears to have considered this fact in
recognizing that specific acts evidence is an important element in the prosecution's case against
the accused. See id. The 1991 amendment to Rule 404(b) provides a qualified notice require-
ment in criminal cases. The amendment requires the prosecution, upon the request of the
accused, to provide notice to the accused in advance of trial of the nature of any specific acts
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. The amendment also permits notice during trial pro-
vided the prosecution makes a showing of good cause why such notice was not provided to the
accused prior to trial. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) & advisory committee's note. The intent of
Congress in adding this amendment to the Rule was to reduce surprise for the accused and
thus help promote early resolution of the question of admissibility. Id.
The amendment probably will have little effect on the substantive question of admissibility
as the amendment focuses primarily on the procedural aspect of introducing specific acts evi-
dence against an accused. The pretrial notice requirement, however, may ultimately affect the
admissibility of such evidence if questions arise regarding the reasonableness, timeliness or
adequacy of the pretrial notice. The amendment expressly requires that once the accused has
requested notice of any specific acts evidence that the prosecution may introduce at trial, the
prosecution "shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial." FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em-
phasis added). Moreover, in cases where the prosecution fails to provide pretrial notice, the
amendment implies that the court must entertain some kind of hearing to determine whether
the prosecution had good cause that excuses the pretrial notice. Thus, the question becomes
whether the court will sanction the prosecution for failing to provide the requisite notice with-
out good cause by excluding the evidence altogether or by some other sanction less costly to
the prosecution's case. Therefore the issue that must now be decided is whether specific acts
evidence is inadmissible not because it is offered for an improper purpose but rather because
the prosecution failed to make its showing of good cause that would excuse the requisite pre-
trial notice to the accused under the Rule.
Because the amendment has recently taken effect, there has been little time for courts to
analyze any substantial effect the procedural requirement might have on the admissibility of
specific acts evidence. Whether the procedural notice requirement will serve to protect the
rights of the accused or facilitate the admissibility of specific acts evidence against him is un-
clear. However, as the defense already had the opportunity to oppose any proffer of such
evidence by the prosecution prior to the enactment of the amendment to Rule 404(b), the new
procedural requirement may only provide more time in which the defense may make its mo-
tion to exclude the evidence. Yet perhaps this amendment is Congress's first step in recogniz-
ing the problems with the current applications of Rule 404(b), which could lead to further
reconsideration of more substantial issues arising under the growing number of exceptions and
their extension to the prohibition against character propensity evidence.
277. See supra notes 216-72 accompanying text.
278. See FED. R. EvID. 403; supra note 261.
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afforded an accused when confronted with an offering of specific acts
evidence under the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory. However, when
such evidence is forced into the mold of a permissible purpose under
Rule 404(b), the argument that undue prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value of the evidence becomes far less persuasive.
If Rule 404(b)'s prohibition against the use of character evidence is
to have any legitimate power, the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory has
no place in the law of evidence. Character evidence is generally excluded
because its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value. 9 This rule
of exclusion clearly applies to evidence of sexual proclivities- evidence
that is arguably of the most inflammatory type. However, if evidence of
sexual propensity is to be admissible against an accused, perhaps Rule
404(b) should be repealed.
Although eliminating Rule 404(b) entirely and allowing the balanc-
ing test of Rule 403 to take its place might solve some problems, it would
ignore the fundamental purpose behind Rule 404(b)'s prohibition. Rule
403 follows the general policy of the federal rules-a bent toward admit-
ting evidence.2 °0 Moreover, the Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory also
leans in favor of admitting evidence of the accused's sexual proclivities.
Yet Rule 404(b) starts from the opposite premise and precludes specific
acts evidence when offered for a character propensity purpose.281 Thus,
eliminating Rule 404(b) would more likely result in greater admissibility
of sexual proclivity evidence since such evidence would need only pass a
minimal relevancy test.282
A more appropriate approach would be to adhere strictly to the gen-
eral prohibition of Rule 404(b) and properly apply the "other purposes"
clause. This would perhaps help curb abuses of the Rule such as the
Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory. By strict adherence to the prohibition,
279. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 1345.
280. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, "[a]U relevant evidence is admissible." FED. R.
EVID. 402. Rule 403 simply limits the general rule in favor of admissibility when the probative
value of relevant evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added); supra
note 261; see also Kuhns, supra note 21, at 800 ('[R]ule 403 provides that a court may exclude
relevant evidence only if its probative value is 'substantially outweighed' by the countervailing
factors. Thus, the balance is likely to be struck in favor of admissibility.").
281. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
282. Without Rule 404(b), there would no longer be any need to meet the Huddleston stan-
dard of proof for the specific acts. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88
(1988). This would simply lessen the number of hoops through which the prosecution would
have to jump in order to have the evidence admitted--even though currently those hoops
appear quite large and close to the ground.
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the Rule should properly be viewed as a rule of exclusion. Courts would
therefore start from the premise that character propensity evidence is
inadmissible. From this starting point, a prosecutor would have to bear a
true burden, as generally is the case in any criminal action, to show a
permissible purpose for the evidence before it would be admitted.283
Thus, the courts would no longer have the luxury of trying to find a
permissible purpose when the prosecution fails to do so. Should the
prosecution succeed in making a proper showing, the evidence should
then be subject to a reverse form of Rule 403's balancing test requiring
that the probative value substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect.
Thus, the accused would receive greater protection than afforded under
the current application of the Rule. The recommended change would
properly create a presumption of inadmissibility of specific acts evidence,
placing the burden of overcoming that presumption on the prosecution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need to punish sex crimes is undeniably great. Our system of
justice must provide prosecutors with ample tools to pursue and convict
perpetrators of such heinous crimes. We must not, however, abandon
the fundamental principle of our jurisprudence in the process. Our soci-
ety must never reject the principle that justice demands that we punish
people, not because of who they are but because of what they have done.
The courts have demonstrated that they do not understand clearly the
permissible purposes for which specific acts evidence may be admitted
against an accused. The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory is a blatant
example of the misapplication of Rule 404(b) in the prosecution of sex
crimes. Consistency demands that we either adhere strictly to the prohi-
bition against admitting specific acts evidence for the purpose of showing
sexual propensity or abandon our belief that justice punishes deeds and
not character. An accused must be afforded protection from evidence of
a highly prejudicial nature. Such evidence must remain inadmissible un-
less offered for a proper purpose where the probative value outweighs the
danger of prejudice. Nevertheless, it appears that this concern carries
little weight under Rule 404(b) as currently applied.
To continue to treat Rule 404(b) as inoperative only in cases of sex
crimes is unmanageable. The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory creates
an exception that swallows the rule. It opens a Pandora's Box and frees
283. While the prosecution bears the ultimate burden of proving guilt in a criminal case and
the moving party bears the burden for admissibility, specific acts evidence is more often offered
by the prosecution against the accused. See Kuhns, supra note 21, at 799. Thus the better rule
would require the prosecution to make a showing why the evidence should be admitted.
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the evils of uncontrollable character evidence into potentially all criminal
trials. It unleashes a torrent of evidence against an accused-evidence
that serves only to confuse and prejudice. Without any substantial stan-
dard for proving that the accused committed the other acts, establishing
a character propensity becomes merely a matter of judicial discretion.
Charges that the accused committed other acts, acts not even violative of
any criminal law, become admissible and create character propensity in-
ferences-inferences that prejudice the position of the accused resulting
in improper conviction. Conduct for which there was insufficient evi-
dence in a civil matter thus serves as admissible evidence in a criminal
trial to prove the accused's sexual proclivities. Thus, the jury is permit-
ted to convict on the basis of that character propensity inference.
An accused is tried for what he has done and not for who he is or
who we may think him to be. To ensure any true protection of this prin-
ciple and afford the accused the protection he is due, we must start from
a presumption that evidence of specific acts is inadmissible to create the
inference that the accused acted in conformity with a character trait.
The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory may be one cure for the difficulties
encountered in prosecuting sex crimes. However, it is a cure that is ulti-
mately worse than the disease.
David J. Kaloyanides *
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for always encouraging me to strive for excellence. The author also wishes to thank Professor
David P. Leonard for his insight into the law of evidence.
June 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:12971342
